OF CRIMES AGAINST THE PERSON

TITLE 8. OF CRIMES AGAINST THE PERSON

PENAL CODE
SECTION 187-199

187. (a) Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, or a
fetus, with malice aforethought.
(b) This section shall not apply to any person who commits an act
that results in the death of a fetus if any of the following apply:
(1) The act complied with the Therapeutic Abortion Act, Article 2
(commencing with Section 123400) of Chapter 2 of Part 2 of Division
106 of the Health and Safety Code.
(2) The act was committed by a holder of a physician’s and surgeon’
s certificate, as defined in the Business and Professions Code, in a
case where, to a medical certainty, the result of childbirth would be
death of the mother of the fetus or where her death from childbirth,
although not medically certain, would be substantially certain or
more likely than not.
(3) The act was solicited, aided, abetted, or consented to by the
mother of the fetus.
(c) Subdivision (b) shall not be construed to prohibit the
prosecution of any person under any other provision of law.

 

188. Such malice may be express or implied. It is express when
there is manifested a deliberate intention unlawfully to take away
the life of a fellow creature. It is implied, when no considerable
provocation appears, or when the circumstances attending the killing
show an abandoned and malignant heart.
When it is shown that the killing resulted from the intentional
doing of an act with express or implied malice as defined above, no
other mental state need be shown to establish the mental state of
malice aforethought. Neither an awareness of the obligation to act
within the general body of laws regulating society nor acting despite
such awareness is included within the definition of malice.

189. All murder which is perpetrated by means of a destructive
device or explosive, a weapon of mass destruction, knowing use of
ammunition designed primarily to penetrate metal or armor, poison,
lying in wait, torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate,
and premeditated killing, or which is committed in the perpetration
of, or attempt to perpetrate, arson, rape, carjacking, robbery,
burglary, mayhem, kidnapping, train wrecking, or any act punishable
under Section 206, 286, 288, 288a, or 289, or any murder which is
perpetrated by means of discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle,
intentionally at another person outside of the vehicle with the
intent to inflict death, is murder of the first degree. All other
kinds of murders are of the second degree.
As used in this section, “destructive device” means any
destructive device as defined in Section 16460, and “explosive” means
any explosive as defined in Section 12000 of the Health and Safety
Code.
As used in this section, “weapon of mass destruction” means any
item defined in Section 11417.
To prove the killing was “deliberate and premeditated,” it shall
not be necessary to prove the defendant maturely and meaningfully
reflected upon the gravity of his or her act.

189.5. (a) Upon a trial for murder, the commission of the homicide
by the defendant being proved, the burden of proving circumstances of
mitigation, or that justify or excuse it, devolves upon the
defendant, unless the proof on the part of the prosecution tends to
show that the crime committed only amounts to manslaughter, or that
the defendant was justifiable or excusable.
(b) Nothing in this section shall apply to or affect any
proceeding under Section 190.3 or 190.4.
190. (a) Every person guilty of murder in the first degree shall be
punished by death, imprisonment in the state prison for life without
the possibility of parole, or imprisonment in the state prison for a
term of 25 years to life. The penalty to be applied shall be
determined as provided in Sections 190.1, 190.2, 190.3, 190.4, and
190.5.
Except as provided in subdivision (b), (c), or (d), every person
guilty of murder in the second degree shall be punished by
imprisonment in the state prison for a term of 15 years to life.
(b) Except as provided in subdivision (c), every person guilty of
murder in the second degree shall be punished by imprisonment in the
state prison for a term of 25 years to life if the victim was a peace
officer, as defined in subdivision (a) of Section 830.1, subdivision
(a), (b), or (c) of Section 830.2, subdivision (a) of Section
830.33, or Section 830.5, who was killed while engaged in the
performance of his or her duties, and the defendant knew, or
reasonably should have known, that the victim was a peace officer
engaged in the performance of his or her duties.
(c) Every person guilty of murder in the second degree shall be
punished by imprisonment in the state prison for a term of life
without the possibility of parole if the victim was a peace officer,
as defined in subdivision (a) of Section 830.1, subdivision (a), (b),
or (c) of Section 830.2, subdivision (a) of Section 830.33, or
Section 830.5, who was killed while engaged in the performance of his
or her duties, and the defendant knew, or reasonably should have
known, that the victim was a peace officer engaged in the performance
of his or her duties, and any of the following facts has been
charged and found true:
(1) The defendant specifically intended to kill the peace officer.
(2) The defendant specifically intended to inflict great bodily
injury, as defined in Section 12022.7, on a peace officer.
(3) The defendant personally used a dangerous or deadly weapon in
the commission of the offense, in violation of subdivision (b) of
Section 12022.
(4) The defendant personally used a firearm in the commission of
the offense, in violation of Section 12022.5.
(d) Every person guilty of murder in the second degree shall be
punished by imprisonment in the state prison for a term of 20 years
to life if the killing was perpetrated by means of shooting a firearm
from a motor vehicle, intentionally at another person outside of the
vehicle with the intent to inflict great bodily injury.
(e) Article 2.5 (commencing with Section 2930) of Chapter 7 of
Title 1 of Part 3 shall not apply to reduce any minimum term of a
sentence imposed pursuant to this section. A person sentenced
pursuant to this section shall not be released on parole prior to
serving the minimum term of confinement prescribed by this section.

190.03. (a) A person who commits first-degree murder that is a hate
crime shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life
without the possibility of parole.
(b) The term authorized by subdivision (a) shall not apply unless
the allegation is charged in the accusatory pleading and admitted by
the defendant or found true by the trier of fact. The court shall not
strike the allegation, except in the interest of justice, in which
case the court shall state its reasons in writing for striking the
allegation.
(c) For the purpose of this section, “hate crime” has the same
meaning as in Section 422.55.
(d) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent
punishment instead pursuant to any other provision of law that
imposes a greater or more severe punishment.

190.05. (a) The penalty for a defendant found guilty of murder in
the second degree, who has served a prior prison term for murder in
the first or second degree, shall be confinement in the state prison
for a term of life without the possibility of parole or confinement
in the state prison for a term of 15 years to life. For purposes of
this section, a prior prison term for murder of the first or second
degree is that time period in which a defendant has spent actually
incarcerated for his or her offense prior to release on parole.
(b) A prior prison term for murder for purposes of this section
includes either of the following:
(1) A prison term served in any state prison or federal penal
institution, including confinement in a hospital or other institution
or facility credited as service of prison time in the jurisdiction
of confinement, as punishment for the commission of an offense which
includes all of the elements of murder in the first or second degree
as defined under California law.
(2) Incarceration at a facility operated by the Youth Authority
for murder of the first or second degree when the person was subject
to the custody, control, and discipline of the Director of
Corrections.
(c) The fact of a prior prison term for murder in the first or
second degree shall be alleged in the accusatory pleading, and either
admitted by the defendant in open court, or found to be true by the
jury trying the issue of guilt or by the court where guilt is
established by a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or by trial by the
court sitting without a jury.
(d) In case of a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant
served a prior prison term for murder in the first or second degree,
the defendant is entitled to a finding that the allegation is not
true.
(e) If the trier of fact finds that the defendant has served a
prior prison term for murder in the first or second degree, there
shall be a separate penalty hearing before the same trier of fact,
except as provided in subdivision (f).
(f) If the defendant was convicted by the court sitting without a
jury, the trier of fact at the penalty hearing shall be a jury unless
a jury is waived by the defendant and the people, in which case the
trier of fact shall be the court. If the defendant was convicted by a
plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the trier of fact shall be a jury
unless a jury is waived by the defendant and the people.
If the trier of fact is a jury and has been unable to reach a
unanimous verdict as to what the penalty shall be, the court shall
dismiss the jury and shall order a new jury impaneled to try the
issue as to what the penalty shall be. If the new jury is unable to
reach a unanimous verdict as to what the penalty shall be, the court
in its discretion shall either order a new jury or impose a
punishment of confinement in the state prison for a term of 15 years
to life.
(g) Evidence presented at any prior phase of the trial, including
any proceeding under a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity
pursuant to Section 1026, shall be considered at any subsequent phase
of the trial, if the trier of fact of the prior phase is the same
trier of fact at the subsequent phase.
(h) In the proceeding on the question of penalty, evidence may be
presented by both the people and the defendant as to any matter
relevant to aggravation, mitigation, and sentence, including, but not
limited to, the nature and circumstances of the present offense, any
prior felony conviction or convictions whether or not such
conviction or convictions involved a crime of violence, the presence
or absence of other criminal activity by the defendant which involved
the use or attempted use of force or violence or which involved the
express or implied threat to use force or violence, and the defendant’
s character, background, history, mental condition, and physical
condition.
However, no evidence shall be admitted regarding other criminal
activity by the defendant which did not involve the use or attempted
use of force or violence or which did not involve the express or
implied threat to use force or violence. As used in this section,
criminal activity does not require a conviction.
However, in no event shall evidence of prior criminal activity be
admitted for an offense for which the defendant was prosecuted and
acquitted. The restriction on the use of this evidence is intended to
apply only to proceedings pursuant to this section and is not
intended to affect statutory or decisional law allowing such evidence
to be used in any other proceedings.
Except for evidence in proof of the offense or the prior prison
term for murder of the first or second degree which subjects a
defendant to the punishment of life without the possibility of
parole, no evidence may be presented by the prosecution in
aggravation unless notice of the evidence to be introduced has been
given to the defendant within a reasonable period of time as
determined by the court, prior to trial. Evidence may be introduced
without such notice in rebuttal to evidence introduced by the
defendant in mitigation.
In determining the penalty, the trier of fact shall take into
account any of the following factors if relevant:
(1) The circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was
convicted in the present proceeding and the existence of the prior
prison term for murder.
(2) The presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant
which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the
express or implied threat to use force or violence.
(3) The presence or absence of any prior felony conviction.
(4) Whether or not the offense was committed while the defendant
was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.
(5) Whether or not the victim was a participant in the defendant’s
homicidal conduct or consented to the homicidal act.
(6) Whether or not the offense was committed under circumstances
which the defendant reasonably believed to be a moral justification
or extenuation for his or her conduct.
(7) Whether or not the defendant acted under extreme duress or
under the substantial domination of another person.
(8) Whether or not at the time of the offense the ability of the
defendant to appreciate the criminality of his or her conduct or to
conform his or her conduct to the requirements of law was impaired as
a result of mental disease or defect, or the effects of
intoxication.
(9) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.
(10) Whether or not the defendant was an accomplice to the offense
and his or her participation in the commission of the offense was
relatively minor.
(11) Any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the
crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime.
After having heard and received all of the evidence, and after
having heard and considered the arguments of counsel, the trier of
fact shall consider, take into account, and be guided by the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances referred to in this section,
and shall impose a sentence of life without the possibility of
parole if the trier of fact concludes that the aggravating
circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances. If the trier of
fact determines that the mitigating circumstances outweigh the
aggravating circumstances, the trier of fact shall impose a sentence
of confinement in the state prison for 15 years to life.
(i) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit the
charging of finding of any special circumstance pursuant to Sections
190.1, 190.2, 190.3, 190.4, and 190.5.

190.1. A case in which the death penalty may be imposed pursuant to
this chapter shall be tried in separate phases as follows:
(a) The question of the defendant’s guilt shall be first
determined. If the trier of fact finds the defendant guilty of first
degree murder, it shall at the same time determine the truth of all
special circumstances charged as enumerated in Section 190.2 except
for a special circumstance charged pursuant to paragraph (2) of
subdivision (a) of Section 190.2 where it is alleged that the
defendant had been convicted in a prior proceeding of the offense of
murder in the first or second degree.
(b) If the defendant is found guilty of first degree murder and
one of the special circumstances is charged pursuant to paragraph (2)
of subdivision (a) of Section 190.2 which charges that the defendant
had been convicted in a prior proceeding of the offense of murder of
the first or second degree, there shall thereupon be further
proceedings on the question of the truth of such special
circumstance.
(c) If the defendant is found guilty of first degree murder and
one or more special circumstances as enumerated in Section 190.2 has
been charged and found to be true, his sanity on any plea of not
guilty by reason of insanity under Section 1026 shall be determined
as provided in Section 190.4. If he is found to be sane, there shall
thereupon be further proceedings on the question of the penalty to be
imposed. Such proceedings shall be conducted in accordance with the
provisions of Section 190.3 and 190.4.

 

190.2. (a) The penalty for a defendant who is found guilty of
murder in the first degree is death or imprisonment in the state
prison for life without the possibility of parole if one or more of
the following special circumstances has been found under Section
190.4 to be true:
(1) The murder was intentional and carried out for financial gain.
(2) The defendant was convicted previously of murder in the first
or second degree. For the purpose of this paragraph, an offense
committed in another jurisdiction, which if committed in California
would be punishable as first or second degree murder, shall be deemed
murder in the first or second degree.
(3) The defendant, in this proceeding, has been convicted of more
than one offense of murder in the first or second degree.
(4) The murder was committed by means of a destructive device,
bomb, or explosive planted, hidden, or concealed in any place, area,
dwelling, building, or structure, and the defendant knew, or
reasonably should have known, that his or her act or acts would
create a great risk of death to one or more human beings.
(5) The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or
preventing a lawful arrest, or perfecting or attempting to perfect,
an escape from lawful custody.
(6) The murder was committed by means of a destructive device,
bomb, or explosive that the defendant mailed or delivered, attempted
to mail or deliver, or caused to be mailed or delivered, and the
defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that his or her act
or acts would create a great risk of death to one or more human
beings.
(7) The victim was a peace officer, as defined in Section 830.1,
830.2, 830.3, 830.31, 830.32, 830.33, 830.34, 830.35, 830.36, 830.37,
830.4, 830.5, 830.6, 830.10, 830.11, or 830.12, who, while engaged
in the course of the performance of his or her duties, was
intentionally killed, and the defendant knew, or reasonably should
have known, that the victim was a peace officer engaged in the
performance of his or her duties; or the victim was a peace officer,
as defined in the above-enumerated sections, or a former peace
officer under any of those sections, and was intentionally killed in
retaliation for the performance of his or her official duties.
(8) The victim was a federal law enforcement officer or agent who,
while engaged in the course of the performance of his or her duties,
was intentionally killed, and the defendant knew, or reasonably
should have known, that the victim was a federal law enforcement
officer or agent engaged in the performance of his or her duties; or
the victim was a federal law enforcement officer or agent, and was
intentionally killed in retaliation for the performance of his or her
official duties.
(9) The victim was a firefighter, as defined in Section 245.1,
who, while engaged in the course of the performance of his or her
duties, was intentionally killed, and the defendant knew, or
reasonably should have known, that the victim was a firefighter
engaged in the performance of his or her duties.
(10) The victim was a witness to a crime who was intentionally
killed for the purpose of preventing his or her testimony in any
criminal or juvenile proceeding, and the killing was not committed
during the commission or attempted commission, of the crime to which
he or she was a witness; or the victim was a witness to a crime and
was intentionally killed in retaliation for his or her testimony in
any criminal or juvenile proceeding. As used in this paragraph,
“juvenile proceeding” means a proceeding brought pursuant to Section
602 or 707 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.
(11) The victim was a prosecutor or assistant prosecutor or a
former prosecutor or assistant prosecutor of any local or state
prosecutor’s office in this or any other state, or of a federal
prosecutor’s office, and the murder was intentionally carried out in
retaliation for, or to prevent the performance of, the victim’s
official duties.
(12) The victim was a judge or former judge of any court of record
in the local, state, or federal system in this or any other state,
and the murder was intentionally carried out in retaliation for, or
to prevent the performance of, the victim’s official duties.
(13) The victim was an elected or appointed official or former
official of the federal government, or of any local or state
government of this or any other state, and the killing was
intentionally carried out in retaliation for, or to prevent the
performance of, the victim’s official duties.
(14) The murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel,
manifesting exceptional depravity. As used in this section, the
phrase “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, manifesting
exceptional depravity” means a conscienceless or pitiless crime that
is unnecessarily torturous to the victim.
(15) The defendant intentionally killed the victim by means of
lying in wait.
(16) The victim was intentionally killed because of his or her
race, color, religion, nationality, or country of origin.
(17) The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in,
or was an accomplice in, the commission of, attempted commission of,
or the immediate flight after committing, or attempting to commit,
the following felonies:
(A) Robbery in violation of Section 211 or 212.5.
(B) Kidnapping in violation of Section 207, 209, or 209.5.
(C) Rape in violation of Section 261.
(D) Sodomy in violation of Section 286.
(E) The performance of a lewd or lascivious act upon the person of
a child under the age of 14 years in violation of Section 288.
(F) Oral copulation in violation of Section 288a.
(G) Burglary in the first or second degree in violation of Section
460.
(H) Arson in violation of subdivision (b) of Section 451.
(I) Train wrecking in violation of Section 219.
(J) Mayhem in violation of Section 203.
(K) Rape by instrument in violation of Section 289.
(L) Carjacking, as defined in Section 215.
(M) To prove the special circumstances of kidnapping in
subparagraph (B), or arson in subparagraph (H), if there is specific
intent to kill, it is only required that there be proof of the
elements of those felonies. If so established, those two special
circumstances are proven even if the felony of kidnapping or arson is
committed primarily or solely for the purpose of facilitating the
murder.
(18) The murder was intentional and involved the infliction of
torture.
(19) The defendant intentionally killed the victim by the
administration of poison.
(20) The victim was a juror in any court of record in the local,
state, or federal system in this or any other state, and the murder
was intentionally carried out in retaliation for, or to prevent the
performance of, the victim’s official duties.
(21) The murder was intentional and perpetrated by means of
discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle, intentionally at another
person or persons outside the vehicle with the intent to inflict
death. For purposes of this paragraph, “motor vehicle” means any
vehicle as defined in Section 415 of the Vehicle Code.
(22) The defendant intentionally killed the victim while the
defendant was an active participant in a criminal street gang, as
defined in subdivision (f) of Section 186.22, and the murder was
carried out to further the activities of the criminal street gang.
(b) Unless an intent to kill is specifically required under
subdivision (a) for a special circumstance enumerated therein, an
actual killer, as to whom the special circumstance has been found to
be true under Section 190.4, need not have had any intent to kill at
the time of the commission of the offense which is the basis of the
special circumstance in order to suffer death or confinement in the
state prison for life without the possibility of parole.
(c) Every person, not the actual killer, who, with the intent to
kill, aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, solicits, requests,
or assists any actor in the commission of murder in the first degree
shall be punished by death or imprisonment in the state prison for
life without the possibility of parole if one or more of the special
circumstances enumerated in subdivision (a) has been found to be true
under Section 190.4.
(d) Notwithstanding subdivision (c), every person, not the actual
killer, who, with reckless indifference to human life and as a major
participant, aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, solicits,
requests, or assists in the commission of a felony enumerated in
paragraph (17) of subdivision (a) which results in the death of some
person or persons, and who is found guilty of murder in the first
degree therefor, shall be punished by death or imprisonment in the
state prison for life without the possibility of parole if a special
circumstance enumerated in paragraph (17) of subdivision (a) has been
found to be true under Section 190.4.
The penalty shall be determined as provided in this section and
Sections 190.1, 190.3, 190.4, and 190.5.
190.25. (a) The penalty for a defendant found guilty of murder in
the first degree shall be confinement in state prison for a term of
life without the possibility of parole in any case in which any of
the following special circumstances has been charged and specially
found under Section 190.4, to be true: the victim was the operator or
driver of a bus, taxicab, streetcar, cable car, trackless trolley,
or other motor vehicle operated on land, including a vehicle operated
on stationary rails or on a track or rail suspended in the air, used
for the transportation of persons for hire, or the victim was a
station agent or ticket agent for the entity providing such
transportation, who, while engaged in the course of the performance
of his or her duties was intentionally killed, and such defendant
knew or reasonably should have known that such victim was the
operator or driver of a bus, taxicab, streetcar, cable car, trackless
trolley, or other motor vehicle operated on land, including a
vehicle operated on stationary rails or on a track or rail suspended
in the air, used for the transportation of persons for hire, or was a
station agent or ticket agent for the entity providing such
transportation, engaged in the performance of his or her duties.
(b) Every person whether or not the actual killer found guilty of
intentionally aiding, abetting, counseling, commanding, inducing,
soliciting, requesting, or assisting any actor in the commission of
murder in the first degree shall suffer confinement in state prison
for a term of life without the possibility of parole, in any case in
which one or more of the special circumstances enumerated in
subdivision (a) of this section has been charged and specially found
under Section 190.4 to be true.
(c) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit the
charging or finding of any special circumstance pursuant to Sections
190.1, 190.2, 190.3, 190.4, and 190.5.

190.3. If the defendant has been found guilty of murder in the
first degree, and a special circumstance has been charged and found
to be true, or if the defendant may be subject to the death penalty
after having been found guilty of violating subdivision (a) of
Section 1672 of the Military and Veterans Code or Sections 37, 128,
219, or 4500 of this code, the trier of fact shall determine whether
the penalty shall be death or confinement in state prison for a term
of life without the possibility of parole. In the proceedings on the
question of penalty, evidence may be presented by both the people and
the defendant as to any matter relevant to aggravation, mitigation,
and sentence including, but not limited to, the nature and
circumstances of the present offense, any prior felony conviction or
convictions whether or not such conviction or convictions involved a
crime of violence, the presence or absence of other criminal activity
by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or
violence or which involved the express or implied threat to use
force or violence, and the defendant’s character, background,
history, mental condition and physical condition.
However, no evidence shall be admitted regarding other criminal
activity by the defendant which did not involve the use or attempted
use of force or violence or which did not involve the express or
implied threat to use force or violence. As used in this section,
criminal activity does not require a conviction.
However, in no event shall evidence of prior criminal activity be
admitted for an offense for which the defendant was prosecuted and
acquitted. The restriction on the use of this evidence is intended to
apply only to proceedings pursuant to this section and is not
intended to affect statutory or decisional law allowing such evidence
to be used in any other proceedings.
Except for evidence in proof of the offense or special
circumstances which subject a defendant to the death penalty, no
evidence may be presented by the prosecution in aggravation unless
notice of the evidence to be introduced has been given to the
defendant within a reasonable period of time as determined by the
court, prior to trial. Evidence may be introduced without such notice
in rebuttal to evidence introduced by the defendant in mitigation.
The trier of fact shall be instructed that a sentence of
confinement to state prison for a term of life without the
possibility of parole may in future after sentence is imposed, be
commuted or modified to a sentence that includes the possibility of
parole by the Governor of the State of California.
In determining the penalty, the trier of fact shall take into
account any of the following factors if relevant:
(a) The circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was
convicted in the present proceeding and the existence of any special
circumstances found to be true pursuant to Section 190.1.
(b) The presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant
which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the
express or implied threat to use force or violence.
(c) The presence or absence of any prior felony conviction.
(d) Whether or not the offense was committed while the defendant
was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.
(e) Whether or not the victim was a participant in the defendant’s
homicidal conduct or consented to the homicidal act.
(f) Whether or not the offense was committed under circumstances
which the defendant reasonably believed to be a moral justification
or extenuation for his conduct.
(g) Whether or not defendant acted under extreme duress or under
the substantial domination of another person.
(h) Whether or not at the time of the offense the capacity of the
defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform
his conduct to the requirements of law was impaired as a result of
mental disease or defect, or the affects of intoxication.
(i) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.
(j) Whether or not the defendant was an accomplice to the offense
and his participation in the commission of the offense was relatively
minor.
(k) Any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the
crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime.
After having heard and received all of the evidence, and after
having heard and considered the arguments of counsel, the trier of
fact shall consider, take into account and be guided by the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances referred to in this section,
and shall impose a sentence of death if the trier of fact concludes
that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating
circumstances. If the trier of fact determines that the mitigating
circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances the trier of
fact shall impose a sentence of confinement in state prison for a
term of life without the possibility of parole.
190.4. (a) Whenever special circumstances as enumerated in Section
190.2 are alleged and the trier of fact finds the defendant guilty of
first degree murder, the trier of fact shall also make a special
finding on the truth of each alleged special circumstance. The
determination of the truth of any or all of the special circumstances
shall be made by the trier of fact on the evidence presented at the
trial or at the hearing held pursuant to Subdivision (b) of Section
190.1.
In case of a reasonable doubt as to whether a special circumstance
is true, the defendant is entitled to a finding that is not true.
The trier of fact shall make a special finding that each special
circumstance charged is either true or not true. Whenever a special
circumstance requires proof of the commission or attempted commission
of a crime, such crime shall be charged and proved pursuant to the
general law applying to the trial and conviction of the crime.
If the defendant was convicted by the court sitting without a
jury, the trier of fact shall be a jury unless a jury is waived by
the defendant and by the people, in which case the trier of fact
shall be the court. If the defendant was convicted by a plea of
guilty, the trier of fact shall be a jury unless a jury is waived by
the defendant and by the people.
If the trier of fact finds that any one or more of the special
circumstances enumerated in Section 190.2 as charged is true, there
shall be a separate penalty hearing, and neither the finding that any
of the remaining special circumstances charged is not true, nor if
the trier of fact is a jury, the inability of the jury to agree on
the issue of the truth or untruth of any of the remaining special
circumstances charged, shall prevent the holding of a separate
penalty hearing.
In any case in which the defendant has been found guilty by a
jury, and the jury has been unable to reach an unanimous verdict that
one or more of the special circumstances charged are true, and does
not reach a unanimous verdict that all the special circumstances
charged are not true, the court shall dismiss the jury and shall
order a new jury impaneled to try the issues, but the issue of guilt
shall not be tried by such jury, nor shall such jury retry the issue
of the truth of any of the special circumstances which were found by
an unanimous verdict of the previous jury to be untrue. If such new
jury is unable to reach the unanimous verdict that one or more of the
special circumstances it is trying are true, the court shall dismiss
the jury and in the court’s discretion shall either order a new jury
impaneled to try the issues the previous jury was unable to reach
the unanimous verdict on, or impose a punishment of confinement in
state prison for a term of 25 years.
(b) If defendant was convicted by the court sitting without a jury
the trier of fact at the penalty hearing shall be a jury unless a
jury is waived by the defendant and the people, in which case the
trier of fact shall be the court. If the defendant was convicted by a
plea of guilty, the trier of fact shall be a jury unless a jury is
waived by the defendant and the people.
If the trier of fact is a jury and has been unable to reach a
unanimous verdict as to what the penalty shall be, the court shall
dismiss the jury and shall order a new jury impaneled to try the
issue as to what the penalty shall be. If such new jury is unable to
reach a unanimous verdict as to what the penalty shall be, the court
in its discretion shall either order a new jury or impose a
punishment of confinement in state prison for a term of life without
the possibility of parole.
(c) If the trier of fact which convicted the defendant of a crime
for which he may be subject to the death penalty was a jury, the same
jury shall consider any plea of not guilty by reason of insanity
pursuant to Section 1026, the truth of any special circumstances
which may be alleged, and the penalty to be applied, unless for good
cause shown the court discharges that jury in which case a new jury
shall be drawn. The court shall state facts in support of the finding
of good cause upon the record and cause them to be entered into the
minutes.
(d) In any case in which the defendant may be subject to the death
penalty, evidence presented at any prior phase of the trial,
including any proceeding under a plea of not guilty by reason of
insanity pursuant to Section 1026 shall be considered an any
subsequent phase of the trial, if the trier of fact of the prior
phase is the same trier of fact at the subsequent phase.
(e) In every case in which the trier of fact has returned a
verdict or finding imposing the death penalty, the defendant shall be
deemed to have made an application for modification of such verdict
or finding pursuant to Subdivision 7 of Section 11. In ruling on the
application, the judge shall review the evidence, consider, take into
account, and be guided by the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances referred to in Section 190.3, and shall make a
determination as to whether the jury’s findings and verdicts that the
aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances are
contrary to law or the evidence presented. The judge shall state on
the record the reasons for his findings.
The judge shall set forth the reasons for his ruling on the
application and direct that they be entered on the Clerk’s minutes.
The denial of the modification of the death penalty verdict pursuant
to subdivision (7) of Section 1181 shall be reviewed on the defendant’
s automatic appeal pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 1239. The
granting of the application shall be reviewed on the People’s appeal
pursuant to paragraph (6).

190.41. Notwithstanding Section 190.4 or any other provision of
law, the corpus delicti of a felony-based special circumstance
enumerated in paragraph (17) of subdivision (a) of Section 190.2 need
not be proved independently of a defendant’s extrajudicial
statement.

190.5. (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the death
penalty shall not be imposed upon any person who is under the age of
18 at the time of the commission of the crime. The burden of proof as
to the age of such person shall be upon the defendant.
(b) The penalty for a defendant found guilty of murder in the
first degree, in any case in which one or more special circumstances
enumerated in Section 190.2 or 190.25 has been found to be true under
Section 190.4, who was 16 years of age or older and under the age of
18 years at the time of the commission of the crime, shall be
confinement in the state prison for life without the possibility of
parole or, at the discretion of the court, 25 years to life.
(c) The trier of fact shall determine the existence of any special
circumstance pursuant to the procedure set forth in Section 190.4.

190.6. (a) The Legislature finds that the sentence in all capital
cases should be imposed expeditiously.
(b) Therefore, in all cases in which a sentence of death has been
imposed on or after January 1, 1997, the opening appellate brief in
the appeal to the State Supreme Court shall be filed no later than
seven months after the certification of the record for completeness
under subdivision (d) of Section 190.8 or receipt by the appellant’s
counsel of the completed record, whichever is later, except for good
cause. However, in those cases where the trial transcript exceeds
10,000 pages, the briefing shall be completed within the time limits
and pursuant to the procedures set by the rules of court adopted by
the Judicial Council.
(c) In all cases in which a sentence of death has been imposed on
or after January 1, 1997, it is the Legislature’s goal that the
appeal be decided and an opinion reaching the merits be filed within
210 days of the completion of the briefing. However, where the appeal
and a petition for writ of habeas corpus is heard at the same time,
the petition should be decided and an opinion reaching the merits
should be filed within 210 days of the completion of the briefing for
the petition.
(d) The failure of the parties or the Supreme Court to meet or
comply with the time limit provided by this section shall not be a
ground for granting relief from a judgment of conviction or sentence
of death.

190.7. (a) The “entire record” referred to in Section 190.6
includes, but is not limited to, the following:
(1) The normal and additional record prescribed in the rules
adopted by the Judicial Council pertaining to an appeal taken by the
defendant from a judgment of conviction.
(2) A copy of any other paper or record on file or lodged with the
superior or municipal court and a transcript of any other oral
proceeding reported in the superior or municipal court pertaining to
the trial of the cause.
(b) Notwithstanding this section, the Judicial Council may adopt
rules, not inconsistent with the purpose of Section 190.6,
specifically pertaining to the content, preparation and certification
of the record on appeal when a judgment of death has been
pronounced.
190.8. (a) In any case in which a death sentence has been imposed,
the record on appeal shall be expeditiously certified in two stages,
the first for completeness and the second for accuracy, as provided
by this section. The trial court may use all reasonable means to
ensure compliance with all applicable statutes and rules of court
pertaining to record certification in capital appeals, including, but
not limited to, the imposition of sanctions.
(b) Within 30 days of the imposition of the death sentence, the
clerk of the superior court shall provide to trial counsel copies of
the clerk’s transcript and shall deliver the transcript as provided
by the court reporter. Trial counsel shall promptly notify the court
if he or she has not received the transcript within 30 days.
(c) During the course of a trial in which the death penalty is
being sought, trial counsel shall alert the court’s attention to any
errors in the transcripts incidentally discovered by counsel while
reviewing them in the ordinary course of trial preparation. The court
shall periodically request that trial counsel provide a list of
errors in the trial transcript during the course of trial and may
hold hearings in connection therewith.
Corrections to the record shall not be required to include
immaterial typographical errors that cannot conceivably cause
confusion.
(d) The trial court shall certify the record for completeness and
for incorporation of all corrections, as provided by subdivision (c),
no later than 90 days after entry of the imposition of the death
sentence unless good cause is shown. However, this time period may be
extended for proceedings in which the trial transcript exceeds
10,000 pages in accordance with the timetable set forth in, or for
good cause pursuant to the procedures set forth in, the rules of
court adopted by the Judicial Council.
(e) Following the imposition of the death sentence and prior to
the deadline set forth in subdivision (d), the trial court shall hold
one or more hearings for trial counsel to address the completeness
of the record and any outstanding errors that have come to their
attention and to certify that they have reviewed all docket sheets to
ensure that the record contains transcripts for any proceedings,
hearings, or discussions that are required to be reported and that
have occurred in the course of the case in any court, as well as all
documents required by this code and the rules adopted by the Judicial
Council.
(f) The clerk of the trial court shall deliver a copy of the
record on appeal to appellate counsel when the clerk receives notice
of counsel’s appointment or retention, or when the record is
certified for completeness under subdivision (d), whichever is later.
(g) The trial court shall certify the record for accuracy no later
than 120 days after the record has been delivered to appellate
counsel. However, this time may be extended pursuant to the timetable
and procedures set forth in the rules of court adopted by the
Judicial Council. The trial court may hold one or more status
conferences for purposes of timely certification of the record for
accuracy, as set forth in the rules of court adopted by the Judicial
Council.
(h) The Supreme Court shall identify in writing to the Judicial
Council any case that has not met the time limit for certification of
the record for completeness under subdivision (d) or for accuracy
under subdivision (g), and shall identify those cases, and its
reasons, for which it has granted an extension of time. The Judicial
Council shall include this information in its annual report to the
Legislature.
(i) As used in this section, “trial counsel” means both the
prosecution and the defense counsel in the trial in which the
sentence of death has been imposed.
(j) This section shall be implemented pursuant to rules of court
adopted by the Judicial Council.
(k) This section shall only apply to those proceedings in which a
sentence of death has been imposed following a trial that was
commenced on or after January 1, 1997.
190.9. (a) (1) In any case in which a death sentence may be
imposed, all proceedings conducted in the superior court, including
all conferences and proceedings, whether in open court, in conference
in the courtroom, or in chambers, shall be conducted on the record
with a court reporter present. The court reporter shall prepare and
certify a daily transcript of all proceedings commencing with the
preliminary hearing. Proceedings prior to the preliminary hearing
shall be reported but need not be transcribed until the court
receives notice as prescribed in paragraph (2).
(2) Upon receiving notification from the prosecution that the
death penalty is being sought, the clerk shall order the
transcription and preparation of the record of all proceedings prior
to and including the preliminary hearing in the manner prescribed by
the Judicial Council in the rules of court. The record of all
proceedings prior to and including the preliminary hearing shall be
certified by the court no later than 120 days following notification
unless the time is extended pursuant to rules of court adopted by the
Judicial Council. Upon certification, the record of all proceedings
is incorporated into the superior court record.
(b) (1) The court shall assign a court reporter who uses
computer-aided transcription equipment to report all proceedings
under this section.
(2) Failure to comply with the requirements of this section
relating to the assignment of court reporters who use computer-aided
transcription equipment is not a ground for reversal.
(c) Any computer-readable transcript produced by court reporters
pursuant to this section shall conform to the requirements of Section
271 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

 

191. The rules of the common law, distinguishing the killing of a
master by his servant, and of a husband by his wife, as petit
treason, are abolished, and these offenses are homicides, punishable
in the manner prescribed by this Chapter.
191.5. (a) Gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated is the
unlawful killing of a human being without malice aforethought, in the
driving of a vehicle, where the driving was in violation of Section
23140, 23152, or 23153 of the Vehicle Code, and the killing was
either the proximate result of the commission of an unlawful act, not
amounting to a felony, and with gross negligence, or the proximate
result of the commission of a lawful act that might produce death, in
an unlawful manner, and with gross negligence.
(b) Vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated is the unlawful
killing of a human being without malice aforethought, in the driving
of a vehicle, where the driving was in violation of Section 23140,
23152, or 23153 of the Vehicle Code, and the killing was either the
proximate result of the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting
to a felony, but without gross negligence, or the proximate result of
the commission of a lawful act that might produce death, in an
unlawful manner, but without gross negligence.
(c) (1) Except as provided in subdivision (d), gross vehicular
manslaughter while intoxicated in violation of subdivision (a) is
punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for 4, 6, or 10 years.
(2) Vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated in violation of
subdivision (b) is punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for
not more than one year or by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h)
of Section 1170 for 16 months or two or four years.
(d) A person convicted of violating subdivision (a) who has one or
more prior convictions of this section or of paragraph (1) of
subdivision (c) of Section 192, subdivision (a) or (b) of Section
192.5 of this code, or of violating Section 23152 punishable under
Sections 23540, 23542, 23546, 23548, 23550, or 23552 of, or convicted
of Section 23153 of, the Vehicle Code, shall be punished by
imprisonment in the state prison for a term of 15 years to life.
Article 2.5 (commencing with Section 2930) of Chapter 7 of Title 1 of
Part 3 shall apply to reduce the term imposed pursuant to this
subdivision.
(e) This section shall not be construed as prohibiting or
precluding a charge of murder under Section 188 upon facts exhibiting
wantonness and a conscious disregard for life to support a finding
of implied malice, or upon facts showing malice consistent with the
holding of the California Supreme Court in People v. Watson, 30 Cal.
3d 290.
(f) This section shall not be construed as making any homicide in
the driving of a vehicle or the operation of a vessel punishable
which is not a proximate result of the commission of an unlawful act,
not amounting to felony, or of the commission of a lawful act which
might produce death, in an unlawful manner.
(g) For the penalties in subdivision (d) to apply, the existence
of any fact required under subdivision (d) shall be alleged in the
information or indictment and either admitted by the defendant in
open court or found to be true by the trier of fact.

 

192. Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without
malice. It is of three kinds:
(a) Voluntary–upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion.
(b) Involuntary–in the commission of an unlawful act, not
amounting to felony; or in the commission of a lawful act which might
produce death, in an unlawful manner, or without due caution and
circumspection. This subdivision shall not apply to acts committed in
the driving of a vehicle.
(c) Vehicular–
(1) Except as provided in subdivision (a) of Section 191.5,
driving a vehicle in the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting
to felony, and with gross negligence; or driving a vehicle in the
commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful
manner, and with gross negligence.
(2) Driving a vehicle in the commission of an unlawful act, not
amounting to felony, but without gross negligence; or driving a
vehicle in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death,
in an unlawful manner, but without gross negligence.
(3) Driving a vehicle in connection with a violation of paragraph
(3) of subdivision (a) of Section 550, where the vehicular collision
or vehicular accident was knowingly caused for financial gain and
proximately resulted in the death of any person. This provision shall
not be construed to prevent prosecution of a defendant for the crime
of murder.
This section shall not be construed as making any homicide in the
driving of a vehicle punishable that is not a proximate result of the
commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to felony, or of the
commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful
manner.
“Gross negligence,” as used in this section, shall not be
construed as prohibiting or precluding a charge of murder under
Section 188 upon facts exhibiting wantonness and a conscious
disregard for life to support a finding of implied malice, or upon
facts showing malice, consistent with the holding of the California
Supreme Court in People v. Watson, 30 Cal. 3d 290.

192.5. Vehicular manslaughter pursuant to subdivision (b) of
Section 191.5 and subdivision (c) of Section 192 is the unlawful
killing of a human being without malice aforethought, and includes:
(a) Operating a vessel in violation of subdivision (b), (c), (d),
(e), or (f) of Section 655 of the Harbors and Navigation Code, and in
the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to felony, and with
gross negligence; or operating a vessel in violation of subdivision
(b), (c), (d), (e), or (f) of Section 655 of the Harbors and
Navigation Code, and in the commission of a lawful act that might
produce death, in an unlawful manner, and with gross negligence.
(b) Operating a vessel in violation of subdivision (b), (c), (d),
(e), or (f) of Section 655 of the Harbors and Navigation Code, and in
the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to felony, but
without gross negligence; or operating a vessel in violation of
subdivision (b), (c), (d), (e), or (f) of Section 655 of the Harbors
and Navigation Code, and in the commission of a lawful act that might
produce death, in an unlawful manner, but without gross negligence.
(c) Operating a vessel in the commission of an unlawful act, not
amounting to a felony, and with gross negligence; or operating a
vessel in the commission of a lawful act that might produce death, in
an unlawful manner, and with gross negligence.
(d) Operating a vessel in the commission of an unlawful act, not
amounting to a felony, but without gross negligence; or operating a
vessel in the commission of a lawful act that might produce death, in
an unlawful manner, but without gross negligence.
(e) A person who flees the scene of the crime after committing a
violation of subdivision (a), (b), or (c), upon conviction, in
addition and consecutive to the punishment prescribed, shall be
punished by an additional term of imprisonment of five years in the
state prison. This additional term shall not be imposed unless the
allegation is charged in the accusatory pleading and admitted by the
defendant or found to be true by the trier of fact. The court shall
not strike a finding that brings a person within the provisions of
this subdivision or an allegation made pursuant to this subdivision.
193. (a) Voluntary manslaughter is punishable by imprisonment in
the state prison for 3, 6, or 11 years.
(b) Involuntary manslaughter is punishable by imprisonment
pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170 for two, three, or four
years.
(c) Vehicular manslaughter is punishable as follows:
(1) A violation of paragraph (1) of subdivision (c) of Section 192
is punishable either by imprisonment in the county jail for not more
than one year or by imprisonment in the state prison for two, four,
or six years.
(2) A violation of paragraph (2) of subdivision (c) of Section 192
is punishable by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than
one year.
(3) A violation of paragraph (3) of subdivision (c) of Section 192
is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for 4, 6, or 10
years.

193.5. Manslaughter committed during the operation of a vessel is
punishable as follows:
(a) A violation of subdivision (a) of Section 192.5 is punishable
by imprisonment in the state prison for 4, 6, or 10 years.
(b) A violation of subdivision (b) of Section 192.5 is punishable
by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year or by
imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170 for 16
months or two or four years.
(c) A violation of subdivision (c) of Section 192.5 is punishable
either by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one year
or by imprisonment in the state prison for two, four, or six years.
(d) A violation of subdivision (d) of Section 192.5 is punishable
by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one year.

193.7. A person convicted of a violation of subdivision (b) of
Section 191.5 that occurred within seven years of two or more
separate violations of Section 23103, as specified in Section
23103.5, of, or Section 23152 or 23153 of, the Vehicle Code, or any
combination thereof, that resulted in convictions, shall be
designated as an habitual traffic offender subject to paragraph (3)
of subdivision (e) of Section 14601.3 of the Vehicle Code, for a
period of three years, subsequent to the conviction. The person shall
be advised of this designation pursuant to subdivision (b) of
Section 13350 of the Vehicle Code.

193.8. (a) An adult, who is the registered owner of a motor vehicle
or in possession of a motor vehicle, shall not relinquish possession
of the vehicle to a minor for the purpose of driving if the
following conditions exist:
(1) The adult owner or person in possession of the vehicle knew or
reasonably should have known that the minor was intoxicated at the
time possession was relinquished.
(2) A petition was sustained or the minor was convicted of a
violation of Section 23103 as specified in Section 23103.5, 23140,
23152, or 23153 of the Vehicle Code or a violation of Section 191.5
or subdivision (a) of Section 192.5.
(3) The minor does not otherwise have a lawful right to possession
of the vehicle.
(b) The offense described in subdivision (a) shall not apply to
commercial bailments, motor vehicle leases, or parking arrangements,
whether or not for compensation, provided by hotels, motels, or food
facilities for customers, guests, or other invitees thereof. For
purposes of this subdivision, hotel and motel shall have the same
meaning as in subdivision (b) of Section 25503.16 of the Business and
Professions Code and food facility shall have the same meaning as in
Section 113785 of the Health and Safety Code.
(c) If an adult is convicted of the offense described in
subdivision (a), that person shall be punished by a fine not
exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by imprisonment in a
county jail not exceeding six months, or by both the fine and
imprisonment. An adult convicted of the offense described in
subdivision (a) shall not be subject to driver’s license suspension
or revocation or attendance at a licensed alcohol or drug education
and counseling program for persons who drive under the influence.

 

194. To make the killing either murder or manslaughter, it is not
requisite that the party die within three years and a day after the
stroke received or the cause of death administered. If death occurs
beyond the time of three years and a day, there shall be a rebuttable
presumption that the killing was not criminal. The prosecution shall
bear the burden of overcoming this presumption. In the computation
of time, the whole of the day on which the act was done shall be
reckoned the first.

195. Homicide is excusable in the following cases:
1. When committed by accident and misfortune, or in doing any
other lawful act by lawful means, with usual and ordinary caution,
and without any unlawful intent.
2. When committed by accident and misfortune, in the heat of
passion, upon any sudden and sufficient provocation, or upon a sudden
combat, when no undue advantage is taken, nor any dangerous weapon
used, and when the killing is not done in a cruel or unusual manner.
196. Homicide is justifiable when committed by public officers and
those acting by their command in their aid and assistance, either–
1. In obedience to any judgment of a competent Court; or,
2. When necessarily committed in overcoming actual resistance to
the execution of some legal process, or in the discharge of any other
legal duty; or,
3. When necessarily committed in retaking felons who have been
rescued or have escaped, or when necessarily committed in arresting
persons charged with felony, and who are fleeing from justice or
resisting such arrest.

197. Homicide is also justifiable when committed by any person in
any of the following cases:
1. When resisting any attempt to murder any person, or to commit a
felony, or to do some great bodily injury upon any person; or,
2. When committed in defense of habitation, property, or person,
against one who manifestly intends or endeavors, by violence or
surprise, to commit a felony, or against one who manifestly intends
and endeavors, in a violent, riotous or tumultuous manner, to enter
the habitation of another for the purpose of offering violence to any
person therein; or,
3. When committed in the lawful defense of such person, or of a
wife or husband, parent, child, master, mistress, or servant of such
person, when there is reasonable ground to apprehend a design to
commit a felony or to do some great bodily injury, and imminent
danger of such design being accomplished; but such person, or the
person in whose behalf the defense was made, if he was the assailant
or engaged in mutual combat, must really and in good faith have
endeavored to decline any further struggle before the homicide was
committed; or,
4. When necessarily committed in attempting, by lawful ways and
means, to apprehend any person for any felony committed, or in
lawfully suppressing any riot, or in lawfully keeping and preserving
the peace.
198. A bare fear of the commission of any of the offenses mentioned
in subdivisions 2 and 3 of Section 197, to prevent which homicide
may be lawfully committed, is not sufficient to justify it. But the
circumstances must be sufficient to excite the fears of a reasonable
person, and the party killing must have acted under the influence of
such fears alone.

198.5. Any person using force intended or likely to cause death or
great bodily injury within his or her residence shall be presumed to
have held a reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or great
bodily injury to self, family, or a member of the household when that
force is used against another person, not a member of the family or
household, who unlawfully and forcibly enters or has unlawfully and
forcibly entered the residence and the person using the force knew or
had reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry occurred.
As used in this section, great bodily injury means a significant
or substantial physical injury.

199. The homicide appearing to be justifiable or excusable, the
person indicted must, upon his trial, be fully acquitted and
discharged.

PENAL CODE
SECTION 203-206.1

203. Every person who unlawfully and maliciously deprives a human
being of a member of his body, or disables, disfigures, or renders it
useless, or cuts or disables the tongue, or puts out an eye, or
slits the nose, ear, or lip, is guilty of mayhem.
204. Mayhem is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for
two, four, or eight years.

205. A person is guilty of aggravated mayhem when he or she
unlawfully, under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to
the physical or psychological well-being of another person,
intentionally causes permanent disability or disfigurement of another
human being or deprives a human being of a limb, organ, or member of
his or her body. For purposes of this section, it is not necessary
to prove an intent to kill. Aggravated mayhem is a felony punishable
by imprisonment in the state prison for life with the possibility of
parole.
206. Every person who, with the intent to cause cruel or extreme
pain and suffering for the purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion,
or for any sadistic purpose, inflicts great bodily injury as defined
in Section 12022.7 upon the person of another, is guilty of torture.
The crime of torture does not require any proof that the victim
suffered pain.

206.1. Torture is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison
for a term of life.

PENAL CODE
SECTION 207-210

207. (a) Every person who forcibly, or by any other means of
instilling fear, steals or takes, or holds, detains, or arrests any
person in this state, and carries the person into another country,
state, or county, or into another part of the same county, is guilty
of kidnapping.
(b) Every person, who for the purpose of committing any act
defined in Section 288, hires, persuades, entices, decoys, or seduces
by false promises, misrepresentations, or the like, any child under
the age of 14 years to go out of this country, state, or county, or
into another part of the same county, is guilty of kidnapping.
(c) Every person who forcibly, or by any other means of instilling
fear, takes or holds, detains, or arrests any person, with a design
to take the person out of this state, without having established a
claim, according to the laws of the United States, or of this state,
or who hires, persuades, entices, decoys, or seduces by false
promises, misrepresentations, or the like, any person to go out of
this state, or to be taken or removed therefrom, for the purpose and
with the intent to sell that person into slavery or involuntary
servitude, or otherwise to employ that person for his or her own use,
or to the use of another, without the free will and consent of that
persuaded person, is guilty of kidnapping.
(d) Every person who, being out of this state, abducts or takes by
force or fraud any person contrary to the law of the place where
that act is committed, and brings, sends, or conveys that person
within the limits of this state, and is afterwards found within the
limits thereof, is guilty of kidnapping.
(e) For purposes of those types of kidnapping requiring force, the
amount of force required to kidnap an unresisting infant or child is
the amount of physical force required to take and carry the child
away a substantial distance for an illegal purpose or with an illegal
intent.
(f) Subdivisions (a) to (d), inclusive, do not apply to any of the
following:
(1) To any person who steals, takes, entices away, detains,
conceals, or harbors any child under the age of 14 years, if that act
is taken to protect the child from danger of imminent harm.
(2) To any person acting under Section 834 or 837.
208. (a) Kidnapping is punishable by imprisonment in the state
prison for three, five, or eight years.
(b) If the person kidnapped is under 14 years of age at the time
of the commission of the crime, the kidnapping is punishable by
imprisonment in the state prison for 5, 8, or 11 years. This
subdivision is not applicable to the taking, detaining, or
concealing, of a minor child by a biological parent, a natural
father, as specified in Section 7611 of the Family Code, an adoptive
parent, or a person who has been granted access to the minor child by
a court order.
(c) In all cases in which probation is granted, the court shall,
except in unusual cases where the interests of justice would best be
served by a lesser penalty, require as a condition of the probation
that the person be confined in the county jail for 12 months. If the
court grants probation without requiring the defendant to be confined
in the county jail for 12 months, it shall specify its reason or
reasons for imposing a lesser penalty.

 

209. (a) Any person who seizes, confines, inveigles, entices,
decoys, abducts, conceals, kidnaps or carries away another person by
any means whatsoever with intent to hold or detain, or who holds or
detains, that person for ransom, reward or to commit extortion or to
exact from another person any money or valuable thing, or any person
who aids or abets any such act, is guilty of a felony, and upon
conviction thereof, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state
prison for life without possibility of parole in cases in which any
person subjected to any such act suffers death or bodily harm, or is
intentionally confined in a manner which exposes that person to a
substantial likelihood of death, or shall be punished by imprisonment
in the state prison for life with the possibility of parole in cases
where no such person suffers death or bodily harm.
(b) (1) Any person who kidnaps or carries away any individual to
commit robbery, rape, spousal rape, oral copulation, sodomy, or any
violation of Section 264.1, 288, or 289, shall be punished by
imprisonment in the state prison for life with the possibility of
parole.
(2) This subdivision shall only apply if the movement of the
victim is beyond that merely incidental to the commission of, and
increases the risk of harm to the victim over and above that
necessarily present in, the intended underlying offense.
(c) In all cases in which probation is granted, the court shall,
except in unusual cases where the interests of justice would best be
served by a lesser penalty, require as a condition of the probation
that the person be confined in the county jail for 12 months. If the
court grants probation without requiring the defendant to be confined
in the county jail for 12 months, it shall specify its reason or
reasons for imposing a lesser penalty.
(d) Subdivision (b) shall not be construed to supersede or affect
Section 667.61. A person may be charged with a violation of
subdivision (b) and Section 667.61. However, a person may not be
punished under subdivision (b) and Section 667.61 for the same act
that constitutes a violation of both subdivision (b) and Section
667.61.

209.5. (a) Any person who, during the commission of a carjacking
and in order to facilitate the commission of the carjacking, kidnaps
another person who is not a principal in the commission of the
carjacking shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for
life with the possibility of parole.
(b) This section shall only apply if the movement of the victim is
beyond that merely incidental to the commission of the carjacking,
the victim is moved a substantial distance from the vicinity of the
carjacking, and the movement of the victim increases the risk of harm
to the victim over and above that necessarily present in the crime
of carjacking itself.
(c) In all cases in which probation is granted, the court shall,
except in unusual cases where the interests of justice would best be
served by a lesser penalty, require as a condition of the probation
that the person be confined in the county jail for 12 months. If the
court grants probation without requiring the defendant to be confined
in the county jail for 12 months, it shall specify its reason or
reasons for imposing a lesser penalty.
210. Every person who for the purpose of obtaining any ransom or
reward, or to extort or exact from any person any money or thing of
value, poses as, or in any manner represents himself to be a person
who has seized, confined, inveigled, enticed, decoyed, abducted,
concealed, kidnapped or carried away any person, or who poses as, or
in any manner represents himself to be a person who holds or detains
such person, or who poses as, or in any manner represents himself to
be a person who has aided or abetted any such act, or who poses as or
in any manner represents himself to be a person who has the
influence, power, or ability, to obtain the release of such person so
seized, confined, inveigled, enticed, decoyed, abducted, concealed,
kidnapped or carried away, is guilty of a felony and upon conviction
thereof shall be punished by imprisonment for two, three or four
years.
Nothing in this section prohibits any person who, in good faith
believes that he can rescue any person who has been seized, confined,
inveigled, enticed, decoyed, abducted, concealed, kidnapped or
carried away, and who has had no part in, or connection with, such
confinement, inveigling, decoying, abducting, concealing, kidnapping,
or carrying away, from offering to rescue or obtain the release of
such person for a monetary consideration or other thing of value.

PENAL CODE
SECTION 210.5

210.5. Every person who commits the offense of false imprisonment,
as defined in Section 236, against a person for purposes of
protection from arrest, which substantially increases the risk of
harm to the victim, or for purposes of using the person as a shield
is punishable by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section
1170 for three, five, or eight years.

PENAL CODE
SECTION 211-215

211. Robbery is the felonious taking of personal property in the
possession of another, from his person or immediate presence, and
against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear.

212. The fear mentioned in Section 211 may be either:
1. The fear of an unlawful injury to the person or property of the
person robbed, or of any relative of his or member of his family;
or,
2. The fear of an immediate and unlawful injury to the person or
property of anyone in the company of the person robbed at the time of
the robbery.

212.5. (a) Every robbery of any person who is performing his or her
duties as an operator of any bus, taxicab, cable car, streetcar,
trackless trolley, or other vehicle, including a vehicle operated on
stationary rails or on a track or rail suspended in the air, and used
for the transportation of persons for hire, every robbery of any
passenger which is perpetrated on any of these vehicles, and every
robbery which is perpetrated in an inhabited dwelling house, a vessel
as defined in Section 21 of the Harbors and Navigation Code which is
inhabited and designed for habitation, an inhabited floating home as
defined in subdivision (d) of Section 18075.55 of the Health and
Safety Code, a trailer coach as defined in the Vehicle Code which is
inhabited, or the inhabited portion of any other building is robbery
of the first degree.
(b) Every robbery of any person while using an automated teller
machine or immediately after the person has used an automated teller
machine and is in the vicinity of the automated teller machine is
robbery of the first degree.
(c) All kinds of robbery other than those listed in subdivisions
(a) and (b) are of the second degree.

213. (a) Robbery is punishable as follows:
(1) Robbery of the first degree is punishable as follows:
(A) If the defendant, voluntarily acting in concert with two or
more other persons, commits the robbery within an inhabited dwelling
house, a vessel as defined in Section 21 of the Harbors and
Navigation Code, which is inhabited and designed for habitation, an
inhabited floating home as defined in subdivision (d) of Section
18075.55 of the Health and Safety Code, a trailer coach as defined in
the Vehicle Code, which is inhabited, or the inhabited portion of
any other building, by imprisonment in the state prison for three,
six, or nine years.
(B) In all cases other than that specified in subparagraph (A), by
imprisonment in the state prison for three, four, or six years.
(2) Robbery of the second degree is punishable by imprisonment in
the state prison for two, three, or five years.
(b) Notwithstanding Section 664, attempted robbery in violation of
paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) is punishable by imprisonment in
the state prison.

214. Every person who goes upon or boards any railroad train, car
or engine, with the intention of robbing any passenger or other
person on such train, car or engine, of any personal property thereon
in the possession or care or under the control of any such passenger
or other person, or who interferes in any manner with any switch,
rail, sleeper, viaduct, culvert, embankment, structure or appliance
pertaining to or connected with any railroad, or places any dynamite
or other explosive substance or material upon or near the track of
any railroad, or who sets fire to any railroad bridge or trestle, or
who shows, masks, extinguishes or alters any light or other signal,
or exhibits or compels any other person to exhibit any false light or
signal, or who stops any such train, car or engine, or slackens the
speed thereof, or who compels or attempts to compel any person in
charge or control thereof to stop any such train, car or engine, or
slacken the speed thereof, with the intention of robbing any
passenger or other person on such train, car or engine, of any
personal property thereon in the possession or charge or under the
control of any such passenger or other person, is guilty of a felony.
215. (a) “Carjacking” is the felonious taking of a motor vehicle in
the possession of another, from his or her person or immediate
presence, or from the person or immediate presence of a passenger of
the motor vehicle, against his or her will and with the intent to
either permanently or temporarily deprive the person in possession of
the motor vehicle of his or her possession, accomplished by means of
force or fear.
(b) Carjacking is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison
for a term of three, five, or nine years.
(c) This section shall not be construed to supersede or affect
Section 211. A person may be charged with a violation of this section
and Section 211. However, no defendant may be punished under this
section and Section 211 for the same act which constitutes a
violation of both this section and Section 211.

PENAL CODE
SECTION 217.1-219.3

217.1. (a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), every person who
commits any assault upon the President or Vice President of the
United States, the Governor of any state or territory, any justice,
judge, or former judge of any local, state, or federal court of
record, any commissioner, referee, or other subordinate judicial
officer of any court of record, the secretary or director of any
executive agency or department of the United States or any state or
territory, or any other official of the United States or any state or
territory holding elective office, any mayor, city council member,
county supervisor, sheriff, district attorney, prosecutor or
assistant prosecutor of any local, state, or federal prosecutor’s
office, a former prosecutor or assistant prosecutor of any local,
state, or federal prosecutor’s office, public defender or assistant
public defender of any local, state, or federal public defender’s
office, a former public defender or assistant public defender of any
local, state, or federal public defender’s office, the chief of
police of any municipal police department, any peace officer, any
juror in any local, state, or federal court of record, or the
immediate family of any of these officials, in retaliation for or to
prevent the performance of the victim’s official duties, shall be
punished by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one year or
by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170.
(b) Notwithstanding subdivision (a), every person who attempts to
commit murder against any person listed in subdivision (a) in
retaliation for or to prevent the performance of the victim’s
official duties, shall be confined in the state prison for a term of
15 years to life. The provisions of Article 2.5 (commencing with
Section 2930) of Chapter 7 of Title 1 of Part 3 shall apply to reduce
any minimum term of 15 years in a state prison imposed pursuant to
this section, but that person shall not otherwise be released on
parole prior to that time.
(c) For the purposes of this section, the following words have the
following meanings:
(1) “Immediate family” means spouse, child, stepchild, brother,
stepbrother, sister, stepsister, mother, stepmother, father, or
stepfather.
(2) “Peace officer” means any person specified in subdivision (a)
of Section 830.1 or Section 830.5.

218. Every person who unlawfully throws out a switch, removes a
rail, or places any obstruction on any railroad with the intention of
derailing any passenger, freight or other train, car or engine, or
who unlawfully places any dynamite or other explosive material or any
other obstruction upon or near the track of any railroad with the
intention of blowing up or derailing any such train, car or engine,
or who unlawfully sets fire to any railroad bridge or trestle, over
which any such train, car or engine must pass with the intention of
wrecking such train, car or engine, is guilty of a felony, and shall
be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life without
possibility of parole.
218.1. Any person who unlawfully and with gross negligence places
or causes to be placed any obstruction upon or near the track of any
railroad that proximately results in either the damaging or derailing
of any passenger, freight, or other train, or injures a rail
passenger or employee, shall be punished by imprisonment pursuant to
subdivision (h) of Section 1170 for two, three, or four years, or by
imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year, or by a
fine not to exceed two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500), or by
both that imprisonment and fine.

219. Every person who unlawfully throws out a switch, removes a
rail, or places any obstruction on any railroad with the intention of
derailing any passenger, freight or other train, car or engine and
thus derails the same, or who unlawfully places any dynamite or other
explosive material or any other obstruction upon or near the track
of any railroad with the intention of blowing up or derailing any
such train, car or engine and thus blows up or derails the same, or
who unlawfully sets fire to any railroad bridge or trestle over which
any such train, car or engine must pass with the intention of
wrecking such train, car or engine, and thus wrecks the same, is
guilty of a felony and punishable with death or imprisonment in the
state prison for life without possibility of parole in cases where
any person suffers death as a proximate result thereof, or
imprisonment in the state prison for life with the possibility of
parole, in cases where no person suffers death as a proximate result
thereof. The penalty shall be determined pursuant to Sections 190.3
and 190.4.

219.1. Every person who unlawfully throws, hurls or projects at a
vehicle operated by a common carrier, while such vehicle is either in
motion or stationary, any rock, stone, brick, bottle, piece of wood
or metal or any other missile of any kind or character, or does any
unlawful act, with the intention of wrecking such vehicle and doing
bodily harm, and thus wrecks the same and causes bodily harm, is
guilty of a felony and punishable by imprisonment pursuant to
subdivision (h) of Section 1170 for two, four, or six years.

219.2. Every person who willfully throws, hurls, or projects a
stone or other hard substance, or shoots a missile, at a train,
locomotive, railway car, caboose, cable railway car, street railway
car, or bus or at a steam vessel or watercraft used for carrying
passengers or freight on any of the waters within or bordering on
this state, is punishable by imprisonment in the county jail not
exceeding one year, or in a state prison, or by fine not exceeding
two thousand dollars ($2,000), or by both such fine and imprisonment.

219.3. Any person who wilfully drops or throws any object or
missile from any toll bridge is guilty of a misdemeanor.

PENAL CODE
SECTION 220-222

220. (a) (1) Except as provided in subdivision (b), any person who
assaults another with intent to commit mayhem, rape, sodomy, oral
copulation, or any violation of Section 264.1, 288, or 289 shall be
punished by imprisonment in the state prison for two, four, or six
years.
(2) Except as provided in subdivision (b), any person who assaults
another person under 18 years of age with the intent to commit rape,
sodomy, oral copulation, or any violation of Section 264.1, 288, or
289 shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for five,
seven, or nine years.
(b) Any person who, in the commission of a burglary of the first
degree, as defined in subdivision (a) of Section 460, assaults
another with intent to commit rape, sodomy, oral copulation, or any
violation of Section 264.1, 288, or 289 shall be punished by
imprisonment in the state prison for life with the possibility of
parole.

222. Every person guilty of administering to another any
chloroform, ether, laudanum, or any controlled substance,
anaesthetic, or intoxicating agent, with intent thereby to enable or
assist himself or herself or any other person to commit a felony, is
guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for
16 months, or two or three years.

PENAL CODE
SECTION 236-237

236. False imprisonment is the unlawful violation of the personal
liberty of another.

236.1. (a) Any person who deprives or violates the personal liberty
of another with the intent to obtain forced labor or services, is
guilty of human trafficking and shall be punished by imprisonment in
the state prison for 5, 8, or 12 years and a fine of not more than
five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000).
(b) Any person who deprives or violates the personal liberty of
another with the intent to effect or maintain a violation of Section
266, 266h, 266i, 266j, 267, 311.1, 311.2, 311.3, 311.4, 311.5, 311.6,
or 518 is guilty of human trafficking and shall be punished by
imprisonment in the state prison for 8, 14, or 20 years and a fine of
not more than five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000).
(c) Any person who causes, induces, or persuades, or attempts to
cause, induce, or persuade, a person who is a minor at the time of
commission of the offense to engage in a commercial sex act, with the
intent to effect or maintain a violation of Section 266, 266h, 266i,
266j, 267, 311.1, 311.2, 311.3, 311.4, 311.5, 311.6, or 518 is
guilty of human trafficking. A violation of this subdivision is
punishable by imprisonment in the state prison as follows:
(1) Five, 8, or 12 years and a fine of not more than five hundred
thousand dollars ($500,000).
(2) Fifteen years to life and a fine of not more than five hundred
thousand dollars ($500,000) when the offense involves force, fear,
fraud, deceit, coercion, violence, duress, menace, or threat of
unlawful injury to the victim or to another person.
(d) In determining whether a minor was caused, induced, or
persuaded to engage in a commercial sex act, the totality of the
circumstances, including the age of the victim, his or her
relationship to the trafficker or agents of the trafficker, and any
handicap or disability of the victim, shall be considered.
(e) Consent by a victim of human trafficking who is a minor at the
time of the commission of the offense is not a defense to a criminal
prosecution under this section.
(f) Mistake of fact as to the age of a victim of human trafficking
who is a minor at the time of the commission of the offense is not a
defense to a criminal prosecution under this section.
(g) The Legislature finds that the definition of human trafficking
in this section is equivalent to the federal definition of a severe
form of trafficking found in Section 7102(8) of Title 22 of the
United States Code.
(h) For purposes of this chapter, the following definitions apply:
(1) “Coercion” includes any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to
cause a person to believe that failure to perform an act would result
in serious harm to or physical restraint against any person; the
abuse or threatened abuse of the legal process; debt bondage; or
providing and facilitating the possession of any controlled substance
to a person with the intent to impair the person’s judgment.
(2) “Commercial sex act” means sexual conduct on account of which
anything of value is given or received by any person.
(3) “Deprivation or violation of the personal liberty of another”
includes substantial and sustained restriction of another’s liberty
accomplished through force, fear, fraud, deceit, coercion, violence,
duress, menace, or threat of unlawful injury to the victim or to
another person, under circumstances where the person receiving or
apprehending the threat reasonably believes that it is likely that
the person making the threat would carry it out.
(4) “Duress” includes a direct or implied threat of force,
violence, danger, hardship, or retribution sufficient to cause a
reasonable person to acquiesce in or perform an act which he or she
would otherwise not have submitted to or performed; a direct or
implied threat to destroy, conceal, remove, confiscate, or possess
any actual or purported passport or immigration document of the
victim; or knowingly destroying, concealing, removing, confiscating,
or possessing any actual or purported passport or immigration
document of the victim.
(5) “Forced labor or services” means labor or services that are
performed or provided by a person and are obtained or maintained
through force, fraud, duress, or coercion, or equivalent conduct that
would reasonably overbear the will of the person.
(6) “Great bodily injury” means a significant or substantial
physical injury.
(7) “Minor” means a person less than 18 years of age.
(8) “Serious harm” includes any harm, whether physical or
nonphysical, including psychological, financial, or reputational
harm, that is sufficiently serious, under all the surrounding
circumstances, to compel a reasonable person of the same background
and in the same circumstances to perform or to continue performing
labor, services, or commercial sexual acts in order to avoid
incurring that harm.
(i) The total circumstances, including the age of the victim, the
relationship between the victim and the trafficker or agents of the
trafficker, and any handicap or disability of the victim, shall be
factors to consider in determining the presence of “deprivation or
violation of the personal liberty of another,” “duress,” and
“coercion” as described in this section.

236.2. Law enforcement agencies shall use due diligence to identify
all victims of human trafficking, regardless of the citizenship of
the person. When a peace officer comes into contact with a person who
has been deprived of his or her personal liberty, a minor who has
engaged in a commercial sex act, a person suspected of violating
subdivision (a) or (b) of Section 647, or a victim of a crime of
domestic violence or sexual assault, the peace officer shall consider
whether the following indicators of human trafficking are present:
(a) Signs of trauma, fatigue, injury, or other evidence of poor
care.
(b) The person is withdrawn, afraid to talk, or his or her
communication is censored by another person.
(c) The person does not have freedom of movement.
(d) The person lives and works in one place.
(e) The person owes a debt to his or her employer.
(f) Security measures are used to control who has contact with the
person.
(g) The person does not have control over his or her own
government-issued identification or over his or her worker
immigration documents.
236.3. Upon conviction of a violation of Section 236.1, if real
property is used to facilitate the commission of the offense, the
procedures for determining whether the property constitutes a
nuisance and the remedies imposed therefor as provided in Article 2
(commencing with Section 11225) of Chapter 3 of Title 1 of Part 4
shall apply.

236.4. (a) Upon the conviction of a person of a violation of
Section 236.1, the court may, in addition to any other penalty, fine,
or restitution imposed, order the defendant to pay an additional
fine not to exceed one million dollars ($1,000,000). In setting the
amount of the fine, the court shall consider any relevant factors,
including, but not limited to, the seriousness and gravity of the
offense, the circumstances and duration of its commission, the amount
of economic gain the defendant derived as a result of the crime, and
the extent to which the victim suffered losses as a result of the
crime.
(b) Any person who inflicts great bodily injury on a victim in the
commission or attempted commission of a violation of Section 236.1
shall be punished by an additional and consecutive term of
imprisonment in the state prison for 5, 7, or 10 years.
(c) Any person who has previously been convicted of a violation of
any crime specified in Section 236.1 shall receive an additional and
consecutive term of imprisonment in the state prison for 5 years for
each additional conviction on charges separately brought and tried.
(d) Every fine imposed and collected pursuant to Section 236.1 and
this section shall be deposited in the Victim-Witness Assistance
Fund, to be administered by the California Emergency Management
Agency (Cal EMA), to fund grants for services for victims of human
trafficking. Seventy percent of the fines collected and deposited
shall be granted to public agencies and nonprofit corporations that
provide shelter, counseling, or other direct services for trafficked
victims. Thirty percent of the fines collected and deposited shall be
granted to law enforcement and prosecution agencies in the
jurisdiction in which the charges were filed to fund human
trafficking prevention, witness protection, and rescue operations.
236.5. (a) Within 15 business days of the first encounter with a
victim of human trafficking, as defined by Section 236.1, law
enforcement agencies shall provide brief letters that satisfy the
following Law Enforcement Agency (LEA) endorsement regulations as
found in paragraph (1) of subdivision (f) of Section 214.11 of Title
8 of the Code of Federal Regulations.
(b) The LEA must be submitted on Supplement B, Declaration of Law
Enforcement Officer for Victim of Trafficking in Persons, of Form
I-914. The LEA endorsement must be filled out completely in
accordance with the instructions contained on the form and must
attach the results of any name or database inquiry performed. In
order to provide persuasive evidence, the LEA endorsement must
contain a description of the victimization upon which the application
is based, including the dates the trafficking in persons and
victimization occurred, and be signed by a supervising official
responsible for the investigation or prosecution of trafficking in
persons. The LEA endorsement must address whether the victim had been
recruited, harbored, transported, provided, or obtained specifically
for either labor or services, or for the purposes of a commercial
sex act.
(c) Where state law enforcement agencies find the grant of a LEA
endorsement to be inappropriate for a victim of trafficking in
persons, the agency shall within 15 days provide the victim with a
letter explaining the grounds of the denial of the LEA. The victim
may submit additional evidence to the law enforcement agency, which
must reconsider the denial of the LEA within one week of the receipt
of additional evidence.
236.6. (a) To prevent dissipation or secreting of assets or
property, the prosecuting agency may, at the same time as or
subsequent to the filing of a complaint or indictment charging human
trafficking under Section 236.1, file a petition with the criminal
division of the superior court of the county in which the accusatory
pleading was filed, seeking a temporary restraining order,
preliminary injunction, the appointment of a receiver, or any other
protective relief necessary to preserve the property or assets. The
filing of the petition shall start a proceeding that shall be pendent
to the criminal proceeding and maintained solely to effect the
remedies available for this crime, including, but not limited to,
payment of restitution and payment of fines. The proceeding shall not
be subject to or governed by the provisions of the Civil Discovery
Act as set forth in Title 4 (commencing with Section 2016.010) of
Part 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The petition shall allege that
the defendant has been charged with human trafficking under Section
236.1 and shall identify that criminal proceeding and the assets and
property to be affected by an order issued pursuant to this section.
(b) The prosecuting agency shall, by personal service or
registered mail, provide notice of the petition to every person who
may have an interest in the property specified in the petition.
Additionally, the notice shall be published for at least three
successive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the county
where the property affected by the order is located. The notice shall
state that any interested person may file a verified claim with the
superior court stating the nature and amount of his or her claimed
interest. The notice shall set forth the time within which a claim of
interest in the protected property shall be filed.
(c) If the property to be preserved is real property, the
prosecuting agency shall record, at the time of filing the petition,
a lis pendens in each county in which the real property is situated
that specifically identifies the property by legal description, the
name of the owner of record, as shown on the latest equalized
assessment roll, and the assessor’s parcel number.
(d) If the property to be preserved consists of assets under the
control of a banking or financial institution, the prosecuting
agency, at the time of filing the petition, may obtain an order from
the court directing the banking or financial institution to
immediately disclose the account numbers and value of the assets of
the accused held by the banking or financial institution. The
prosecuting agency shall file a supplemental petition, specifically
identifying which banking or financial institution accounts shall be
subject to a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, or
other protective remedy.
(e) A person claiming an interest in the protected property or
assets may, at any time within 30 days from the date of the first
publication of the notice of the petition, or within 30 days after
receipt of actual notice, whichever is later, file with the superior
court of the county in which the action is pending a verified claim
stating the nature and amount of his or her interest in the property
or assets. A verified copy of the claim shall be served by the
claimant on the Attorney General or district attorney, as
appropriate.
(f) Concurrent with or subsequent to the filing of the petition,
the prosecuting agency may move the superior court for, and the
superior court may issue, any of the following pendente lite orders
to preserve the status quo of the property or assets alleged in the
petition:
(1) An injunction to restrain any person from transferring,
encumbering, hypothecating, or otherwise disposing of the property or
assets.
(2) Appointment of a receiver to take possession of, care for,
manage, and operate the assets and properties so that they may be
maintained and preserved. The court may order that a receiver
appointed pursuant to this section shall be compensated for all
reasonable expenditures made or incurred by him or her in connection
with the possession, care, management, and operation of property or
assets that are subject to the provisions of this section.
(3) Requiring a bond or other undertaking, in lieu of other
orders, of a value sufficient to ensure the satisfaction of
restitution and fines imposed pursuant to Section 236.1.
(g) The following procedures shall be followed in processing the
petition:
(1) No preliminary injunction shall be granted or receiver
appointed without notice to the interested parties and a hearing to
determine that the order is necessary to preserve the property or
assets, pending the outcome of the criminal proceedings. However, a
temporary restraining order may be issued pending that hearing
pursuant to the provisions of Section 527 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. The temporary restraining order may be based upon the
sworn declaration of a peace officer with personal knowledge of the
criminal investigation that establishes probable cause to believe
that human trafficking has taken place and that the amount of
restitution and fines established pursuant to subdivision (f) exceeds
or equals the worth of the property or assets subject to the
temporary restraining order. The declaration may include the hearsay
statements of witnesses to establish the necessary facts. The
temporary restraining order may be issued without notice upon a
showing of good cause to the court.
(2) The defendant, or a person who has filed a verified claim,
shall have the right to have the court conduct an order to show cause
hearing within 10 days of the service of the request for a hearing
upon the prosecuting agency, in order to determine whether the
temporary restraining order should remain in effect, whether relief
should be granted from a lis pendens recorded pursuant to subdivision
(c), or whether an existing order should be modified in the
interests of justice. Upon a showing of good cause, the hearing shall
be held within two days of the service of the request for a hearing
upon the prosecuting agency.
(3) In determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order in a proceeding brought by a prosecuting
agency in conjunction with or subsequent to the filing of an
allegation pursuant to this section, the court has the discretion to
consider any matter that it deems reliable and appropriate, including
hearsay statements, in order to reach a just and equitable decision.
The court shall weigh the relative degree of certainty of the
outcome on the merits and the consequences to each of the parties of
granting the interim relief. If the prosecution is likely to prevail
on the merits and the risk of the dissipation of assets outweighs the
potential harm to the defendants and the interested parties, the
court shall grant injunctive relief. The court shall give significant
weight to the following factors:
(A) The public interest in preserving the property or assets
pendente lite.
(B) The difficulty of preserving the property or assets pendente
lite where the underlying alleged crimes involve human trafficking.
(C) The fact that the requested relief is being sought by a public
prosecutor on behalf of alleged victims of human trafficking.
(D) The likelihood that substantial public harm has occurred where
the human trafficking is alleged to have been committed.
(E) The significant public interest involved in compensating
victims of human trafficking and paying court-imposed restitution and
fines.
(4) The court, in making its orders, may consider a defendant’s
request for the release of a portion of the property affected by this
section in order to pay reasonable legal fees in connection with the
criminal proceeding, necessary and appropriate living expenses
pending trial and sentencing, and for the purpose of posting bail.
The court shall weigh the needs of the public to retain the property
against the needs of the defendant to a portion of the property. The
court shall consider the factors listed in paragraph (3) prior to
making an order releasing property for these purposes.
(5) The court, in making its orders, shall seek to protect the
interests of innocent third parties, including an innocent spouse,
who were not involved in the commission of criminal activity.
(6) The orders shall be no more extensive than necessary to effect
the remedies available for the crime. In determining the amount of
property to be held, the court shall ascertain the amount of fines
that are assessed for a violation of this chapter and the amount of
possible restitution.
(7) A petition filed pursuant to this section is part of the
criminal proceedings for purposes of appointment of counsel and shall
be assigned to the criminal division of the superior court of the
county in which the accusatory pleading was filed.
(8) Based upon a noticed motion brought by the receiver appointed
pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivision (f), the court may order an
interlocutory sale of property named in the petition when the
property is liable to perish, to waste, or to be significantly
reduced in value, or when the expenses of maintaining the property
are disproportionate to the value of the property. The proceeds of
the interlocutory sale shall be deposited with the court or as
directed by the court pending determination of the proceeding
pursuant to this section.
(9) The court may make any orders that are necessary to preserve
the continuing viability of a lawful business enterprise that is
affected by the issuance of a temporary restraining order or
preliminary injunction issued pursuant to this section.
(10) In making its orders, the court shall seek to prevent the
property or asset subject to a temporary restraining order or
preliminary injunction from perishing, spoiling, going to waste, or
otherwise being significantly reduced in value. Where the potential
for diminution in value exists, the court shall appoint a receiver to
dispose of or otherwise protect the value of the property or asset.
(11) A preservation order shall not be issued against an asset of
a business that is not likely to be dissipated and that may be
subject to levy or attachment to meet the purposes of this section.
(h) If the allegation of human trafficking is dismissed or found
by the trier of fact to be untrue, a preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order issued pursuant to this section shall be
dissolved. If a jury is the trier of fact, and the jury is unable to
reach a unanimous verdict, the court shall have the discretion to
continue or dissolve all or a portion of the preliminary injunction
or temporary restraining order based upon the interests of justice.
However, if the prosecuting agency elects not to retry the case, a
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order issued pursuant
to this section shall be dissolved.
(i) (1) (A) If the defendant is convicted of human trafficking,
the trial judge shall continue the preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order until the date of the criminal sentencing
and shall make a finding at that time as to what portion, if any, of
the property or assets subject to the preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order shall be levied upon to pay fines and
restitution to victims of the crime. The order imposing fines and
restitution may exceed the total worth of the property or assets
subjected to the preliminary injunction or temporary restraining
order. The court may order the immediate transfer of the property or
assets to satisfy a restitution order issued pursuant to Section
1202.4 and a fine imposed pursuant to this chapter.
(B) If the execution of judgment is stayed pending an appeal of an
order of the superior court pursuant to this section, the
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order shall be
maintained in full force and effect during the pendency of the
appellate period.
(2) The order imposing fines and restitution shall not affect the
interest in real property of a third party that was acquired prior to
the recording of the lis pendens, unless the property was obtained
from the defendant other than as a bona fide purchaser for value. If
any assets or property affected by this section are subject to a
valid lien, mortgage, security interest, or interest under a
conditional sales contract and the amount due to the holder of the
lien, mortgage, interest, or contract is less than the appraised
value of the property, that person may pay to the state or the local
government that initiated the proceeding the amount of the difference
between the appraised value of the property and the amount of the
lien, mortgage, security interest, or interest under a conditional
sales contract. Upon that payment, the state or local entity shall
relinquish all claims to the property. If the holder of the interest
elects not to make that payment to the state or local governmental
entity, the interest in the property shall be deemed transferred to
the state or local governmental entity and any indicia of ownership
of the property shall be confirmed in the state or local governmental
entity. The appraised value shall be determined as of the date
judgment is entered either by agreement between the holder of the
lien, mortgage, security interest, or interest under a conditional
sales contract and the governmental entity involved or, if they
cannot agree, then by a court-appointed appraiser for the county in
which the action is brought. A person holding a valid lien, mortgage,
security interest, or interest under a conditional sales contract
shall be paid the appraised value of his or her interest.
(3) In making its final order, the court shall seek to protect the
legitimately acquired interests of innocent third parties, including
an innocent spouse, who were not involved in the commission of
criminal activity.
(j) In all cases where property is to be levied upon pursuant to
this section, a receiver appointed by the court shall be empowered to
liquidate all property or assets, which shall be distributed in the
following order of priority:
(1) To the receiver, or court-appointed appraiser, for all
reasonable expenditures made or incurred by him or her in connection
with the sale of the property or liquidation of assets, including all
reasonable expenditures for necessary repairs, storage, or
transportation of property levied upon under this section.
(2) To a holder of a valid lien, mortgage, or security interest,
up to the amount of his or her interest in the property or proceeds.
(3) To a victim as restitution for human trafficking that was
alleged in the accusatory pleading and that was proven by the
prosecution.
(4) For payment of a fine imposed. The proceeds obtained in
payment of a fine shall be paid in the manner set forth in
subdivision (h) of Section 236.1.

236.7. (a) Any interest in a vehicle, boat, airplane, money,
negotiable instruments, securities, real property, or other thing of
value that was put to substantial use for the purpose of facilitating
the crime of human trafficking that involves a commercial sex act,
as defined in paragraph (2) of subdivision (g) of Section 236.1,
where the victim was less than 18 years of age at the time of the
commission of the crime, may be seized and ordered forfeited by the
court upon the conviction of a person guilty of human trafficking
that involves a commercial sex act where the victim is an individual
under 18 years of age, pursuant to Section 236.1.
(b) In any case in which a defendant is convicted of human
trafficking pursuant to Section 236.1 and an allegation is found to
be true that the victim was a person under 18 years of age and the
crime involved a commercial sex act, as defined in paragraph (2) of
subdivision (g) of Section 236.1, the following assets shall be
subject to forfeiture upon proof of the provisions of subdivision (d)
of Section 236.9:
(1) Any property interest, whether tangible or intangible,
acquired through human trafficking that involves a commercial sex act
where the victim was less than 18 years of age at the time of the
commission of the crime.
(2) All proceeds from human trafficking that involves a commercial
sex act where the victim was less than 18 years of age at the time
of the commission of the crime, which property shall include all
things of value that may have been received in exchange for the
proceeds immediately derived from the act.
(c) If a prosecuting agency petitions for forfeiture of an
interest under subdivision (a) or (b), the process prescribed in
Sections 236.8 to 236.12, inclusive, shall apply, but no local or
state prosecuting agency shall be required to petition for forfeiture
in any case.
(d) Real property that is used as a family residence or for other
lawful purposes, or that is owned by two or more persons, one of whom
had no knowledge of its unlawful use, shall not be subject to
forfeiture.
(e) An interest in a vehicle that may be lawfully driven with a
class C, class M1, or class M2 license, as prescribed in Section
12804.9 of the Vehicle Code, may not be forfeited under this section
if there is a community property interest in the vehicle by a person
other than the defendant and the vehicle is the sole vehicle of this
type available to the defendant’s immediate family.
(f) Real property subject to forfeiture may not be seized, absent
exigent circumstances, without notice to the interested parties and a
hearing to determine that seizure is necessary to preserve the
property pending the outcome of the proceedings. At the hearing, the
prosecution shall bear the burden of establishing that probable cause
exists for the forfeiture of the property and that seizure is
necessary to preserve the property pending the outcome of the
forfeiture proceedings. The court may issue a seizure order pursuant
to this section if it finds that seizure is warranted or a pendente
lite order pursuant to Section 236.10 if it finds that the status quo
or value of the property can be preserved without seizure.
(g) For purposes of this section, no allegation or proof of a
pattern of criminal profiteering activity is required.

236.8. (a) If the prosecuting agency, in conjunction with the
criminal proceeding, files a petition of forfeiture with the superior
court of the county in which the defendant has been charged with
human trafficking that involves a commercial sex act, as defined in
paragraph (2) of subdivision (g) of Section 236.1, where the victim
was less than 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the
crime, the prosecuting agency shall make service of process of a
notice regarding that petition upon every individual who may have a
property interest in the alleged proceeds or instruments. The notice
shall state that any interested party may file a verified claim with
the superior court stating the amount of their claimed interest and
an affirmation or denial of the prosecuting agency’s allegation. If
the notice cannot be given by registered mail or personal delivery,
the notice shall be published for at least three successive weeks in
a newspaper of general circulation in the county where the property
is located. If the property alleged to be subject to forfeiture is
real property, the prosecuting agency shall, at the time of filing
the petition of forfeiture, record a lis pendens with the county
recorder in each county in which the real property is situated that
specifically identifies the real property alleged to be subject to
forfeiture. The judgment of forfeiture shall not affect the interest
in real property of a third party that was acquired prior to the
recording of the lis pendens.
(b) All notices shall set forth the time within which a claim of
interest in the property seized is required to be filed pursuant to
Section 236.9.
236.9. (a) A person claiming an interest in the property, proceeds,
or instruments may, at any time within 30 days from the date of the
first publication of the notice of seizure or within 30 days after
receipt of actual notice, file with the superior court of the county
in which the action is pending a verified claim stating his or her
interest in the property, proceeds, or instruments. A verified copy
of the claim shall be given by the claimant to the Attorney General
or district attorney, as appropriate.
(b) (1) If, at the end of the time set forth in subdivision (a),
an interested person, other than the defendant, has not filed a
claim, the court, upon motion, shall declare that the person has
defaulted upon his or her alleged interest and the interest shall be
subject to forfeiture upon proof of the provisions of subdivision
(d).
(2) The defendant may admit or deny that the property is subject
to forfeiture pursuant to the provisions of this chapter. If the
defendant fails to admit or deny or to file a claim of interest in
the property, proceeds, or instruments, the court shall enter a
response of denial on behalf of the defendant.
(c) (1) The forfeiture proceeding shall be set for hearing in the
superior court in which the underlying criminal offense will be
tried.
(2) If the defendant is found guilty of the underlying offense,
the issue of forfeiture shall be promptly tried, either before the
same jury or before a new jury in the discretion of the court, unless
waived by the consent of all parties.
(d) At the forfeiture hearing, the prosecuting agency shall have
the burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that the
property alleged in the petition comes within the provisions of
Section 236.7.
(e) Unless the trier of fact finds that the seized property was
used for a purpose for which forfeiture is permitted, the court shall
order the seized property released to the person that the court
determines is entitled to possession of that property. If the trier
of fact finds that the seized property was used for a purpose for
which forfeiture is permitted, but does not find that a person who
has a valid interest in the property had actual knowledge that the
property would be or was used for a purpose for which forfeiture is
permitted and consented to that use, the court shall order the
property released to the claimant.
236.10. (a) Concurrent with or subsequent to the filing of the
petition, the prosecuting agency may move the superior court for, and
the superior court may issue, the following pendente lite orders to
preserve the status quo of the property alleged in the petition:
(1) An injunction to restrain anyone from transferring,
encumbering, hypothecating, or otherwise disposing of the property.
(2) Appointment of a receiver to take possession of, care for,
manage, and operate the assets and properties so that the property
may be maintained and preserved. The court may order that a receiver
appointed pursuant to this section be compensated for all reasonable
expenditures made or incurred by him or her in connection with the
possession, care, management, and operation of property or assets
that are subject to the provisions of this section.
(b) No preliminary injunction may be granted or receiver appointed
without notice to the interested parties and a hearing to determine
that an order is necessary to preserve the property, pending the
outcome of the criminal proceedings, and that there is probable cause
to believe that the property alleged in the forfeiture proceedings
are proceeds, instruments, or property interests forfeitable under
the provisions of Section 236.7. However, a temporary restraining
order may issue pending that hearing pursuant to the provisions of
Section 527 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
(c) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court in
granting these motions may order a surety bond or undertaking to
preserve the property interests of the interested parties.
(d) The court shall, in making its orders, seek to protect the
interests of those who may be involved in the same enterprise as the
defendant, but who were not involved in human trafficking that
involves a commercial sex act, as defined in paragraph (2) of
subdivision (g) of Section 236.1, where the victim was less than 18
years of age at the time of the commission of the crime.
236.11. (a) If the trier of fact at the forfeiture hearing finds
that the alleged property, instruments, or proceeds are forfeitable
pursuant to Section 236.7 and the defendant was engaged in human
trafficking that involves a commercial sex act, as defined in
paragraph (2) of subdivision (g) of Section 236.1, where the victim
was less than 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the
crime, the court shall declare that property or proceeds forfeited to
the state or local governmental entity, subject to distribution as
provided in Section 236.12. No property solely owned by a bona fide
purchaser for value shall be subject to forfeiture.
(b) If the trier of fact at the forfeiture hearing finds that the
alleged property is forfeitable pursuant to Section 236.7 but does
not find that a person holding a valid lien, mortgage, security
interest, or interest under a conditional sales contract acquired
that interest with actual knowledge that the property was to be used
for a purpose for which forfeiture is permitted, and the amount due
to that person is less than the appraised value of the property, that
person may pay to the state or the local governmental entity that
initiated the forfeiture proceeding the amount of the registered
owner’s equity, which shall be deemed to be the difference between
the appraised value and the amount of the lien, mortgage, security
interest, or interest under a conditional sales contract. Upon
payment, the state or local governmental entity shall relinquish all
claims to the property. If the holder of the interest elects not to
pay the state or local governmental entity, the property shall be
deemed forfeited to the state or local governmental entity and the
ownership certificate shall be forwarded. The appraised value shall
be determined as of the date judgment is entered either by agreement
between the legal owner and the governmental entity involved, or, if
they cannot agree, by a court-appointed appraiser for the county in
which the action is brought. A person holding a valid lien, mortgage,
security interest, or interest under a conditional sales contract
shall be paid the appraised value of his or her interest.
(c) If the amount due to a person holding a valid lien, mortgage,
security interest, or interest under a conditional sales contract is
less than the value of the property and the person elects not to make
payment to the governmental entity, the property shall be sold at
public auction by the Department of General Services or by the local
governmental entity. The seller shall provide notice of the sale by
one publication in a newspaper published and circulated in the city,
community, or locality where the sale is to take place.
(d) Notwithstanding subdivision (c), a county may dispose of real
property forfeited to the county pursuant to this chapter by the
process prescribed in Section 25538.5 of the Government Code.

236.12. Notwithstanding that no response or claim has been filed
pursuant to Section 236.9, in all cases where property is forfeited
pursuant to this chapter and, if necessary, sold by the Department of
General Services or local governmental entity, the money forfeited
or the proceeds of sale shall be distributed by the state or local
governmental entity as follows:
(a) To the bona fide or innocent purchaser, conditional sales
vendor, or holder of a valid lien, mortgage, or security interest, if
any, up to the amount of his or her interest in the property or
proceeds, when the court declaring the forfeiture orders a
distribution to that person. The court shall endeavor to discover all
those lienholders and protect their interests and may, at its
discretion, order the proceeds placed in escrow for up to an
additional 60 days to ensure that all valid claims are received and
processed.
(b) To the Department of General Services or local governmental
entity for all expenditures made or incurred by it in connection with
the sale of the property, including expenditures for necessary
repairs, storage, or transportation of property seized under this
chapter.
(c) (1) Fifty percent to the General Fund of the state or local
governmental entity, whichever prosecutes or handles the forfeiture
hearing.
(2) Fifty percent to the Victim-Witness Assistance Fund to be used
upon appropriation for grants to community-based organizations that
serve victims of human trafficking.

237. (a) False imprisonment is punishable by a fine not exceeding
one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by imprisonment in the county jail
for not more than one year, or by both that fine and imprisonment. If
the false imprisonment be effected by violence, menace, fraud, or
deceit, it shall be punishable by imprisonment pursuant to
subdivision (h) of Section 1170.
(b) False imprisonment of an elder or dependent adult by use of
violence, menace, fraud, or deceit shall be punishable as described
in subdivision (f) of Section 368.

PENAL CODE
SECTION 240-248

240. An assault is an unlawful attempt, coupled with a present
ability, to commit a violent injury on the person of another.

241. (a) An assault is punishable by a fine not exceeding one

thousand dollars ($1,000), or by imprisonment in the county jail not
exceeding six months, or by both the fine and imprisonment.
(b) When an assault is committed against the person of a parking
control officer engaged in the performance of his or her duties, and
the person committing the offense knows or reasonably should know
that the victim is a parking control officer, the assault is
punishable by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars ($2,000), or
by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding six months, or by
both the fine and imprisonment.
(c) When an assault is committed against the person of a peace
officer, firefighter, emergency medical technician, mobile intensive
care paramedic, lifeguard, process server, traffic officer, code
enforcement officer, animal control officer, or search and rescue
member engaged in the performance of his or her duties, or a
physician or nurse engaged in rendering emergency medical care
outside a hospital, clinic, or other health care facility, and the
person committing the offense knows or reasonably should know that
the victim is a peace officer, firefighter, emergency medical
technician, mobile intensive care paramedic, lifeguard, process
server, traffic officer, code enforcement officer, animal control
officer, or search and rescue member engaged in the performance of
his or her duties, or a physician or nurse engaged in rendering
emergency medical care, the assault is punishable by a fine not
exceeding two thousand dollars ($2,000), or by imprisonment in a
county jail not exceeding one year, or by both the fine and
imprisonment.
(d) As used in this section, the following definitions apply:
(1) Peace officer means any person defined in Chapter 4.5
(commencing with Section 830) of Title 3 of Part 2.
(2) “Emergency medical technician” means a person possessing a
valid course completion certificate from a program approved by the
State Department of Health Care Services for the medical training and
education of ambulance personnel, and who meets the standards of
Division 2.5 (commencing with Section 1797) of the Health and Safety
Code.
(3) “Mobile intensive care paramedic” refers to those persons who
meet the standards set forth in Division 2.5 (commencing with Section
1797) of the Health and Safety Code.
(4) “Nurse” means a person who meets the standards of Division 2.5
(commencing with Section 1797) of the Health and Safety Code.
(5) “Lifeguard” means a person who is:
(A) Employed as a lifeguard by the state, a county, or a city, and
is designated by local ordinance as a public officer who has a duty
and responsibility to enforce local ordinances and misdemeanors
through the issuance of citations.
(B) Wearing distinctive clothing which includes written
identification of the person’s status as a lifeguard and which
clearly identifies the employing organization.
(6) “Process server” means any person who meets the standards or
is expressly exempt from the standards set forth in Section 22350 of
the Business and Professions Code.
(7) “Traffic officer” means any person employed by a county or
city to monitor and enforce state laws and local ordinances relating
to parking and the operation of vehicles.
(8) “Animal control officer” means any person employed by a county
or city for purposes of enforcing animal control laws or
regulations.
(9) (A) “Code enforcement officer” means any person who is not
described in Chapter 4.5 (commencing with Section 830) of Title 3 of
Part 2 and who is employed by any governmental subdivision, public or
quasi-public corporation, public agency, public service corporation,
any town, city, county, or municipal corporation, whether
incorporated or chartered, that has enforcement authority for health,
safety, and welfare requirements, and whose duties include
enforcement of any statute, rules, regulations, or standards, and who
is authorized to issue citations, or file formal complaints.
(B) “Code enforcement officer” also includes any person who is
employed by the Department of Housing and Community Development who
has enforcement authority for health, safety, and welfare
requirements pursuant to the Employee Housing Act (Part 1 (commencing
with Section 17000) of Division 13 of the Health and Safety Code);
the State Housing Law (Part 1.5 (commencing with Section 17910) of
Division 13 of the Health and Safety Code); the Manufactured Housing
Act of 1980 (Part 2 (commencing with Section 18000) of Division 13 of
the Health and Safety Code); the Mobilehome Parks Act (Part 2.1
(commencing with Section 18200) of Division 13 of the Health and
Safety Code); and the Special Occupancy Parks Act (Part 2.3
(commencing with Section 18860) of Division 13 of the Health and
Safety Code).
(10) “Parking control officer” means any person employed by a
city, county, or city and county, to monitor and enforce state laws
and local ordinances relating to parking.
(11) “Search and rescue member” means any person who is part of an
organized search and rescue team managed by a governmental agency.
241.1. When an assault is committed against the person of a
custodial officer as defined in Section 831 or 831.5, and the person
committing the offense knows or reasonably should know that the
victim is a custodial officer engaged in the performance of his or
her duties, the offense shall be punished by imprisonment in the
county jail not exceeding one year or by imprisonment pursuant to
subdivision (h) of Section 1170.

241.2. (a) (1) When an assault is committed on school or park
property against any person, the assault is punishable by a fine not
exceeding two thousand dollars ($2,000), or by imprisonment in the
county jail not exceeding one year, or by both that fine and
imprisonment.
(2) When a violation of this section is committed by a minor on
school property, the court may, in addition to any other fine,
sentence, or as a condition of probation, order the minor to attend
counseling as deemed appropriate by the court at the expense of the
minor’s parents. The court shall take into consideration the ability
of the minor’s parents to pay, however, no minor shall be relieved of
attending counseling because of the minor’s parents’ inability to
pay for the counseling imposed by this section.
(b) “School,” as used in this section, means any elementary
school, junior high school, four-year high school, senior high
school, adult school or any branch thereof, opportunity school,
continuation high school, regional occupational center, evening high
school, technical school, or community college.
(c) “Park,” as used in this section, means any publicly maintained
or operated park. It does not include any facility when used for
professional sports or commercial events.
241.3. (a) When an assault is committed against any person on the
property of, or on a motor vehicle of, a public transportation
provider, the offense shall be punished by a fine not to exceed two
thousand dollars ($2,000), or by imprisonment in a county jail not to
exceed one year, or by both the fine and imprisonment.
(b) As used in this section, “public transportation provider”
means a publicly or privately owned entity that operates, for the
transportation of persons for hire, a bus, taxicab, streetcar, cable
car, trackless trolley, or other motor vehicle, including a vehicle
operated on stationary rails or on a track or rail suspended in air,
or that operates a schoolbus.
(c) As used in this section, “on the property of” means the entire
station where public transportation is available, including the
parking lot reserved for the public who utilize the transportation
system.

241.4. An assault is punishable by fine not exceeding one thousand
dollars ($1,000), or by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding
six months, or by both. When the assault is committed against the
person of a peace officer engaged in the performance of his or her
duties as a member of a police department of a school district
pursuant to Section 38000 of the Education Code, and the person
committing the offense knows or reasonably should know that the
victim is a peace officer engaged in the performance of his or her
duties, the offense shall be punished by imprisonment in the county
jail not exceeding one year or by imprisonment pursuant to
subdivision (h) of Section 1170.

241.5. (a) When an assault is committed against a highway worker
engaged in the performance of his or her duties and the person
committing the offense knows or reasonably should know that the
victim is a highway worker engaged in the performance of his or her
duties, the offense shall be punishable by a fine not to exceed two
thousand dollars ($2,000) or by imprisonment in a county jail up to
one year or by both that fine and imprisonment.
(b) As used in this section, “highway worker” means an employee of
the Department of Transportation, a contractor or employee of a
contractor while working under contract with the Department of
Transportation, an employee of a city, county, or city and county, a
contractor or employee of a contractor while working under contract
with a city, county, or city and county, or a volunteer as defined in
Section 1720.4 of the Labor Code who does one or more of the
following:
(1) Performs maintenance, repair, or construction of state highway
or local street or road infrastructures and associated rights-of-way
in highway or local street or road work zones.
(2) Operates equipment on state highway or local street or road
infrastructures and associated rights-of-way in highway or local
street or road work zones.
(3) Performs any related maintenance work, as required, on state
highway or local street or road infrastructures in highway or local
street or road work zones.
241.6. When an assault is committed against a school employee
engaged in the performance of his or her duties, or in retaliation
for an act performed in the course of his or her duties, whether on
or off campus, during the schoolday or at any other time, and the
person committing the offense knows or reasonably should know the
victim is a school employee, the assault is punishable by
imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by a fine
not exceeding two thousand dollars ($2,000), or by both the fine and
imprisonment.
For purposes of this section, “school employee” has the same
meaning as defined in subdivision (d) of Section 245.5.
This section shall not apply to conduct arising during the course
of an otherwise lawful labor dispute.

241.7. Any person who is a party to a civil or criminal action in
which a jury has been selected to try the case and who, while the
legal action is pending or after the conclusion of the trial, commits
an assault against any juror or alternate juror who was selected and
sworn in that legal action, shall be punished by a fine not to
exceed two thousand dollars ($2,000), or by imprisonment in the
county jail not exceeding one year, or by both such fine and
imprisonment, or by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of
Section 1170.
241.8. (a) Any person who commits an assault against a member of
the United States Armed Forces because of the victim’s service in the
United States Armed Forces shall be punished by a fine not exceeding
two thousand dollars ($2,000), by imprisonment in a county jail for
a period not exceeding one year, or by both that fine and
imprisonment.
(b) “Because of” means that the bias motivation must be a cause in
fact of the assault, whether or not other causes exist. When
multiple concurrent motives exist, the prohibited bias must be a
substantial factor in bringing about the assault.

242. A battery is any willful and unlawful use of force or violence
upon the person of another.

243. (a) A battery is punishable by a fine not exceeding two
thousand dollars ($2,000), or by imprisonment in a county jail not
exceeding six months, or by both that fine and imprisonment.
(b) When a battery is committed against the person of a peace
officer, custodial officer, firefighter, emergency medical
technician, lifeguard, security officer, custody assistant, process
server, traffic officer, code enforcement officer, animal control
officer, or search and rescue member engaged in the performance of
his or her duties, whether on or off duty, including when the peace
officer is in a police uniform and is concurrently performing the
duties required of him or her as a peace officer while also employed
in a private capacity as a part-time or casual private security guard
or patrolman, or a nonsworn employee of a probation department
engaged in the performance of his or her duties, whether on or off
duty, or a physician or nurse engaged in rendering emergency medical
care outside a hospital, clinic, or other health care facility, and
the person committing the offense knows or reasonably should know
that the victim is a peace officer, custodial officer, firefighter,
emergency medical technician, lifeguard, security officer, custody
assistant, process server, traffic officer, code enforcement officer,
animal control officer, or search and rescue member engaged in the
performance of his or her duties, nonsworn employee of a probation
department, or a physician or nurse engaged in rendering emergency
medical care, the battery is punishable by a fine not exceeding two
thousand dollars ($2,000), or by imprisonment in a county jail not
exceeding one year, or by both that fine and imprisonment.
(c) (1) When a battery is committed against a custodial officer,
firefighter, emergency medical technician, lifeguard, process server,
traffic officer, or animal control officer engaged in the
performance of his or her duties, whether on or off duty, or a
nonsworn employee of a probation department engaged in the
performance of his or her duties, whether on or off duty, or a
physician or nurse engaged in rendering emergency medical care
outside a hospital, clinic, or other health care facility, and the
person committing the offense knows or reasonably should know that
the victim is a nonsworn employee of a probation department,
custodial officer, firefighter, emergency medical technician,
lifeguard, process server, traffic officer, or animal control officer
engaged in the performance of his or her duties, or a physician or
nurse engaged in rendering emergency medical care, and an injury is
inflicted on that victim, the battery is punishable by a fine of not
more than two thousand dollars ($2,000), by imprisonment in a county
jail not exceeding one year, or by both that fine and imprisonment,
or by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170 for 16
months, or two or three years.
(2) When the battery specified in paragraph (1) is committed
against a peace officer engaged in the performance of his or her
duties, whether on or off duty, including when the peace officer is
in a police uniform and is concurrently performing the duties
required of him or her as a peace officer while also employed in a
private capacity as a part-time or casual private security guard or
patrolman and the person committing the offense knows or reasonably
should know that the victim is a peace officer engaged in the
performance of his or her duties, the battery is punishable by a fine
of not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or by imprisonment
in a county jail not exceeding one year or pursuant to subdivision
(h) of Section 1170 for 16 months, or two or three years, or by both
that fine and imprisonment.
(d) When a battery is committed against any person and serious
bodily injury is inflicted on the person, the battery is punishable
by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year or
imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170 for two,
three, or four years.
(e) (1) When a battery is committed against a spouse, a person
with whom the defendant is cohabiting, a person who is the parent of
the defendant’s child, former spouse, fiancé, or fiancée, or a person
with whom the defendant currently has, or has previously had, a
dating or engagement relationship, the battery is punishable by a
fine not exceeding two thousand dollars ($2,000), or by imprisonment
in a county jail for a period of not more than one year, or by both
that fine and imprisonment. If probation is granted, or the execution
or imposition of the sentence is suspended, it shall be a condition
thereof that the defendant participate in, for no less than one year,
and successfully complete, a batterer’s treatment program, as
described in Section 1203.097, or if none is available, another
appropriate counseling program designated by the court. However, this
provision shall not be construed as requiring a city, a county, or a
city and county to provide a new program or higher level of service
as contemplated by Section 6 of Article XIII B of the California
Constitution.
(2) Upon conviction of a violation of this subdivision, if
probation is granted, the conditions of probation may include, in
lieu of a fine, one or both of the following requirements:
(A) That the defendant make payments to a battered women’s
shelter, up to a maximum of five thousand dollars ($5,000).
(B) That the defendant reimburse the victim for reasonable costs
of counseling and other reasonable expenses that the court finds are
the direct result of the defendant’s offense.
For any order to pay a fine, make payments to a battered women’s
shelter, or pay restitution as a condition of probation under this
subdivision, the court shall make a determination of the defendant’s
ability to pay. In no event shall any order to make payments to a
battered women’s shelter be made if it would impair the ability of
the defendant to pay direct restitution to the victim or
court-ordered child support. If the injury to a married person is
caused in whole or in part by the criminal acts of his or her spouse
in violation of this section, the community property shall not be
used to discharge the liability of the offending spouse for
restitution to the injured spouse, required by Section 1203.04, as
operative on or before August 2, 1995, or Section 1202.4, or to a
shelter for costs with regard to the injured spouse and dependents,
required by this section, until all separate property of the
offending spouse is exhausted.
(3) Upon conviction of a violation of this subdivision, if
probation is granted or the execution or imposition of the sentence
is suspended and the person has been previously convicted of a
violation of this subdivision and sentenced under paragraph (1), the
person shall be imprisoned for not less than 48 hours in addition to
the conditions in paragraph (1). However, the court, upon a showing
of good cause, may elect not to impose the mandatory minimum
imprisonment as required by this subdivision and may, under these
circumstances, grant probation or order the suspension of the
execution or imposition of the sentence.
(4) The Legislature finds and declares that these specified crimes
merit special consideration when imposing a sentence so as to
display society’s condemnation for these crimes of violence upon
victims with whom a close relationship has been formed.
(5) If a peace officer makes an arrest for a violation of
paragraph (1) of subdivision (e) of this section, the peace officer
is not required to inform the victim of his or her right to make a
citizen’s arrest pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 836.
(f) As used in this section:
(1) “Peace officer” means any person defined in Chapter 4.5
(commencing with Section 830) of Title 3 of Part 2.
(2) “Emergency medical technician” means a person who is either an
EMT-I, EMT-II, or EMT-P (paramedic), and possesses a valid
certificate or license in accordance with the standards of Division
2.5 (commencing with Section 1797) of the Health and Safety Code.
(3) “Nurse” means a person who meets the standards of Division 2.5
(commencing with Section 1797) of the Health and Safety Code.
(4) “Serious bodily injury” means a serious impairment of physical
condition, including, but not limited to, the following: loss of
consciousness; concussion; bone fracture; protracted loss or
impairment of function of any bodily member or organ; a wound
requiring extensive suturing; and serious disfigurement.
(5) “Injury” means any physical injury which requires professional
medical treatment.
(6) “Custodial officer” means any person who has the
responsibilities and duties described in Section 831 and who is
employed by a law enforcement agency of any city or county or who
performs those duties as a volunteer.
(7) “Lifeguard” means a person defined in paragraph (5) of
subdivision (d) of Section 241.
(8) “Traffic officer” means any person employed by a city, county,
or city and county to monitor and enforce state laws and local
ordinances relating to parking and the operation of vehicles.
(9) “Animal control officer” means any person employed by a city,
county, or city and county for purposes of enforcing animal control
laws or regulations.
(10) “Dating relationship” means frequent, intimate associations
primarily characterized by the expectation of affectional or sexual
involvement independent of financial considerations.
(11) (A) “Code enforcement officer” means any person who is not
described in Chapter 4.5 (commencing with Section 830) of Title 3 of
Part 2 and who is employed by any governmental subdivision, public or
quasi-public corporation, public agency, public service corporation,
any town, city, county, or municipal corporation, whether
incorporated or chartered, who has enforcement authority for health,
safety, and welfare requirements, and whose duties include
enforcement of any statute, rules, regulations, or standards, and who
is authorized to issue citations, or file formal complaints.
(B) “Code enforcement officer” also includes any person who is
employed by the Department of Housing and Community Development who
has enforcement authority for health, safety, and welfare
requirements pursuant to the Employee Housing Act (Part 1 (commencing
with Section 17000) of Division 13 of the Health and Safety Code);
the State Housing Law (Part 1.5 (commencing with Section 17910) of
Division 13 of the Health and Safety Code); the Manufactured Housing
Act of 1980 (Part 2 (commencing with Section 18000) of Division 13 of
the Health and Safety Code); the Mobilehome Parks Act (Part 2.1
(commencing with Section 18200) of Division 13 of the Health and
Safety Code); and the Special Occupancy Parks Act (Part 2.3
(commencing with Section 18860) of Division 13 of the Health and
Safety Code).
(12) “Custody assistant” means any person who has the
responsibilities and duties described in Section 831.7 and who is
employed by a law enforcement agency of any city, county, or city and
county.
(13) “Search and rescue member” means any person who is part of an
organized search and rescue team managed by a government agency.
(14) “Security officer” means any person who has the
responsibilities and duties described in Section 831.4 and who is
employed by a law enforcement agency of any city, county, or city and
county.
(g) It is the intent of the Legislature by amendments to this
section at the 1981-82 and 1983-84 Regular Sessions to abrogate the
holdings in cases such as People v. Corey, 21 Cal. 3d 738, and
Cervantez v. J.C. Penney Co., 24 Cal. 3d 579, and to reinstate prior
judicial interpretations of this section as they relate to criminal
sanctions for battery on peace officers who are employed, on a
part-time or casual basis, while wearing a police uniform as private
security guards or patrolmen and to allow the exercise of peace
officer powers concurrently with that employment.

243.1. When a battery is committed against the person of a
custodial officer as defined in Section 831 of the Penal Code, and
the person committing the offense knows or reasonably should know
that the victim is a custodial officer engaged in the performance of
his or her duties, and the custodial officer is engaged in the
performance of his or her duties, the offense shall be punished by
imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170.

243.2. (a) (1) Except as otherwise provided in Section 243.6, when
a battery is committed on school property, park property, or the
grounds of a public or private hospital, against any person, the
battery is punishable by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars
($2,000), or by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one
year, or by both the fine and imprisonment.
(2) When a violation of this section is committed by a minor on
school property, the court may, in addition to any other fine,
sentence, or as a condition of probation, order the minor to attend
counseling as deemed appropriate by the court at the expense of the
minor’s parents. The court shall take into consideration the ability
of the minor’s parents to pay, however, no minor shall be relieved of
attending counseling because of the minor’s parents’ inability to
pay for the counseling imposed by this section.
(b) For the purposes of this section, the following terms have the
following meanings:
(1) “Hospital” means a facility for the diagnosis, care, and
treatment of human illness that is subject to, or specifically
exempted from, the licensure requirements of Chapter 2 (commencing
with Section 1250) of Division 2 of the Health and Safety Code.
(2) “Park” means any publicly maintained or operated park. It does
not include any facility when used for professional sports or
commercial events.
(3) “School” means any elementary school, junior high school,
four-year high school, senior high school, adult school or any branch
thereof, opportunity school, continuation high school, regional
occupational center, evening high school, technical school, or
community college.
(c) This section shall not apply to conduct arising during the
course of an otherwise lawful labor dispute.

243.25. When a battery is committed against the person of an elder
or a dependent adult as defined in Section 368, with knowledge that
he or she is an elder or a dependent adult, the offense shall be
punishable by a fine not to exceed two thousand dollars ($2,000), or
by imprisonment in a county jail not to exceed one year, or by both
that fine and imprisonment.

243.3. When a battery is committed against the person of an
operator, driver, or passenger on a bus, taxicab, streetcar, cable
car, trackless trolley, or other motor vehicle, including a vehicle
operated on stationary rails or on a track or rail suspended in the
air, used for the transportation of persons for hire, or against a
schoolbus driver, or against the person of a station agent or ticket
agent for the entity providing the transportation, and the person who
commits the offense knows or reasonably should know that the victim,
in the case of an operator, driver, or agent, is engaged in the
performance of his or her duties, or is a passenger the offense shall
be punished by a fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars ($10,000),
or by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by
both that fine and imprisonment. If an injury is inflicted on that
victim, the offense shall be punished by a fine not exceeding ten
thousand dollars ($10,000), or by imprisonment in a county jail not
exceeding one year or in the state prison for 16 months, or two or
three years, or by both that fine and imprisonment.
243.35. (a) Except as provided in Section 243.3, when a battery is
committed against any person on the property of, or in a motor
vehicle of, a public transportation provider, the offense shall be
punished by a fine not to exceed two thousand dollars ($2,000), or by
imprisonment in a county jail not to exceed one year, or by both the
fine and imprisonment.
(b) As used in this section, “public transportation provider”
means a publicly or privately owned entity that operates, for the
transportation of persons for hire, a bus, taxicab, streetcar, cable
car, trackless trolley, or other motor vehicle, including a vehicle
operated on stationary rails or on a track or rail suspended in air,
or that operates a schoolbus.
(c) As used in this section, “on the property of” means the entire
station where public transportation is available, including the
parking lot reserved for the public who utilize the transportation
system.
243.4. (a) Any person who touches an intimate part of another
person while that person is unlawfully restrained by the accused or
an accomplice, and if the touching is against the will of the person
touched and is for the purpose of sexual arousal, sexual
gratification, or sexual abuse, is guilty of sexual battery. A
violation of this subdivision is punishable by imprisonment in a
county jail for not more than one year, and by a fine not exceeding
two thousand dollars ($2,000); or by imprisonment in the state prison
for two, three, or four years, and by a fine not exceeding ten
thousand dollars ($10,000).
(b) Any person who touches an intimate part of another person who
is institutionalized for medical treatment and who is seriously
disabled or medically incapacitated, if the touching is against the
will of the person touched, and if the touching is for the purpose of
sexual arousal, sexual gratification, or sexual abuse, is guilty of
sexual battery. A violation of this subdivision is punishable by
imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year, and by a
fine not exceeding two thousand dollars ($2,000); or by imprisonment
in the state prison for two, three, or four years, and by a fine not
exceeding ten thousand dollars ($10,000).
(c) Any person who touches an intimate part of another person for
the purpose of sexual arousal, sexual gratification, or sexual abuse,
and the victim is at the time unconscious of the nature of the act
because the perpetrator fraudulently represented that the touching
served a professional purpose, is guilty of sexual battery. A
violation of this subdivision is punishable by imprisonment in a
county jail for not more than one year, and by a fine not exceeding
two thousand dollars ($2,000); or by imprisonment in the state prison
for two, three, or four years, and by a fine not exceeding ten
thousand dollars ($10,000).
(d) Any person who, for the purpose of sexual arousal, sexual
gratification, or sexual abuse, causes another, against that person’s
will while that person is unlawfully restrained either by the
accused or an accomplice, or is institutionalized for medical
treatment and is seriously disabled or medically incapacitated, to
masturbate or touch an intimate part of either of those persons or a
third person, is guilty of sexual battery. A violation of this
subdivision is punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for not
more than one year, and by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars
($2,000); or by imprisonment in the state prison for two, three, or
four years, and by a fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars
($10,000).
(e) (1) Any person who touches an intimate part of another person,
if the touching is against the will of the person touched, and is
for the specific purpose of sexual arousal, sexual gratification, or
sexual abuse, is guilty of misdemeanor sexual battery, punishable by
a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars ($2,000), or by
imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding six months, or by both
that fine and imprisonment. However, if the defendant was an employer
and the victim was an employee of the defendant, the misdemeanor
sexual battery shall be punishable by a fine not exceeding three
thousand dollars ($3,000), by imprisonment in a county jail not
exceeding six months, or by both that fine and imprisonment.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any amount of a fine
above two thousand dollars ($2,000) which is collected from a
defendant for a violation of this subdivision shall be transmitted to
the State Treasury and, upon appropriation by the Legislature,
distributed to the Department of Fair Employment and Housing for the
purpose of enforcement of the California Fair Employment and Housing
Act (Part 2.8 (commencing with Section 12900) of Division 3 of Title
2 of the Government Code), including, but not limited to, laws that
proscribe sexual harassment in places of employment. However, in no
event shall an amount over two thousand dollars ($2,000) be
transmitted to the State Treasury until all fines, including any
restitution fines that may have been imposed upon the defendant, have
been paid in full.
(2) As used in this subdivision, “touches” means physical contact
with another person, whether accomplished directly, through the
clothing of the person committing the offense, or through the
clothing of the victim.
(f) As used in subdivisions (a), (b), (c), and (d), “touches”
means physical contact with the skin of another person whether
accomplished directly or through the clothing of the person
committing the offense.
(g) As used in this section, the following terms have the
following meanings:
(1) “Intimate part” means the sexual organ, anus, groin, or
buttocks of any person, and the breast of a female.
(2) “Sexual battery” does not include the crimes defined in
Section 261 or 289.
(3) “Seriously disabled” means a person with severe physical or
sensory disabilities.
(4) “Medically incapacitated” means a person who is incapacitated
as a result of prescribed sedatives, anesthesia, or other medication.
(5) “Institutionalized” means a person who is located voluntarily
or involuntarily in a hospital, medical treatment facility, nursing
home, acute care facility, or mental hospital.
(6) “Minor” means a person under 18 years of age.
(h) This section shall not be construed to limit or prevent
prosecution under any other law which also proscribes a course of
conduct that also is proscribed by this section.
(i) In the case of a felony conviction for a violation of this
section, the fact that the defendant was an employer and the victim
was an employee of the defendant shall be a factor in aggravation in
sentencing.
(j) A person who commits a violation of subdivision (a), (b), (c),
or (d) against a minor when the person has a prior felony conviction
for a violation of this section shall be guilty of a felony,
punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for two, three, or
four years and a fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars ($10,000).

243.5. (a) When a person commits an assault or battery on school
property during hours when school activities are being conducted, a
peace officer may, without a warrant, notwithstanding paragraph (2)
or (3) of subdivision (a) of Section 836, arrest the person who
commits the assault or battery:
(1) Whenever the person has committed the assault or battery,
although not in the peace officer’s presence.
(2) Whenever the peace officer has reasonable cause to believe
that the person to be arrested has committed the assault or battery,
whether or not it has in fact been committed.
(b) “School,” as used in this section, means any elementary
school, junior high school, four-year high school, senior high
school, adult school or any branch thereof, opportunity school,
continuation high school, regional occupational center, evening high
school, technical school, or community college.

243.6. When a battery is committed against a school employee
engaged in the performance of his or her duties, or in retaliation
for an act performed in the course of his or her duties, whether on
or off campus, during the schoolday or at any other time, and the
person committing the offense knows or reasonably should know that
the victim is a school employee, the battery is punishable by
imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by a fine
not exceeding two thousand dollars ($2,000), or by both the fine and
imprisonment. However, if an injury is inflicted on the victim, the
battery shall be punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for not
more than one year, or by a fine of not more than two thousand
dollars ($2,000), or by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of
Section 1170 for 16 months, or two or three years.
For purposes of this section, “school employee” has the same
meaning as defined in subdivision (d) of Section 245.5.
This section shall not apply to conduct arising during the course
of an otherwise lawful labor dispute.

243.65. (a) When a battery is committed against the person of a
highway worker engaged in the performance of his or her duties and
the person committing the offense knows or reasonably should know
that the victim is a highway worker engaged in the performance of his
or her duties, the offense shall be punished by a fine not exceeding
two thousand dollars ($2,000), or by imprisonment in a county jail
not exceeding one year, or by both that fine and imprisonment.
(b) As used in this section, “highway worker” means an employee of
the Department of Transportation, a contractor or employee of a
contractor while working under contract with the Department of
Transportation, an employee of a city, county, or city and county, a
contractor or employee of a contractor while working under contract
with a city, county, or city and county, or a volunteer as defined in
Section 1720.4 of the Labor Code who does one or more of the
following:
(1) Performs maintenance, repair, or construction of state highway
or local street or road infrastructures and associated rights-of-way
in highway or local street or road work zones.
(2) Operates equipment on state highway or local street or road
infrastructures and associated rights-of-way in highway or local
street or road work zones.
(3) Performs any related maintenance work, as required, on state
highway or local street or road infrastructures in highway or local
street or road work zones.

243.7. Any person who is a party to a civil or criminal action in
which a jury has been selected to try the case and who, while the
legal action is pending or after the conclusion of the trial commits
a battery against any juror or alternate juror who was selected and
sworn in that legal action shall be punished by a fine not to exceed
five thousand dollars ($5,000), or by imprisonment in the county jail
not exceeding one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment, or by
the imprisonment in the state prison for 16 months, or for two or
three years.
243.8. (a) When a battery is committed against a sports official
immediately prior to, during, or immediately following an
interscholastic, intercollegiate, or any other organized amateur or
professional athletic contest in which the sports official is
participating, and the person who commits the offense knows or
reasonably should know that the victim is engaged in the performance
of his or her duties, the offense shall be punishable by a fine not
exceeding two thousand dollars ($2,000), or by imprisonment in the
county jail not exceeding one year, or by both that fine and
imprisonment.
(b) For purposes of this section, “sports official” means any
individual who serves as a referee, umpire, linesman, or who serves
in a similar capacity but may be known by a different title or name
and is duly registered by, or a member of, a local, state, regional,
or national organization engaged in part in providing education and
training to sports officials.

243.83. (a) It is unlawful for any person attending a professional
sporting event to do any of the following:
(1) Throw any object on or across the court or field of play with
the intent to interfere with play or distract a player.
(2) Enter upon the court or field of play without permission from
an authorized person any time after the authorized participants of
play have entered the court or field to begin the sporting event and
until the participants of play have completed the playing time of the
sporting event.
(b) (1) The owner of the facility in which a professional sporting
event is to be held shall provide a notice specifying the unlawful
activity prohibited by this section and the punishment for engaging
in that prohibited activity.
(2) The notice shall be prominently displayed throughout the
facility or may be provided by some other manner, such as on a big
screen or by a general public announcement. In addition, notice shall
be posted at all controlled entry areas of the sporting facility.
(3) Failure to provide the notice shall not be a defense to a
violation of this section.
(c) For the purposes of this section, the following terms have the
following meanings:
(1) “Player” includes any authorized participant of play,
including, but not limited to, team members, referees however
designated, and support staff, whether or not any of those persons
receive compensation.
(2) “Professional sporting event” means a scheduled sporting event
involving a professional sports team or organization or a
professional athlete for which an admission fee is charged to the
public.
(d) A violation of subdivision (a) is an infraction punishable by
a fine not exceeding two hundred fifty dollars ($250). The fine shall
not be subject to penalty assessments as provided in Section 1464 or
1465.7 of this code or Section 76000 of the Government Code.
(e) This section shall apply to attendees at professional sporting
events; this section shall not apply to players or to sports
officials, as defined in Section 243.8.
(f) Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or prevent
prosecution under any applicable provision of law.

243.85. The owner of any professional sports facility shall post,
visible from a majority of the seating in the stands at all times, at
controlled entry areas, and at parking facilities that are part of
the professional sports facility, written notices displaying the text
message number and telephone number to contact security in order to
report a violent act.

243.9. (a) Every person confined in any local detention facility
who commits a battery by gassing upon the person of any peace
officer, as defined in Chapter 4.5 (commencing with Section 830) of
Title 3 of Part 2, or employee of the local detention facility is
guilty of aggravated battery and shall be punished by imprisonment in
a county jail or by imprisonment in the state prison for two, three,
or four years.
(b) For purposes of this section, “gassing” means intentionally
placing or throwing, or causing to be placed or thrown, upon the
person of another, any human excrement or other bodily fluids or
bodily substances or any mixture containing human excrement or other
bodily fluids or bodily substances that results in actual contact
with the person’s skin or membranes.
(c) The person in charge of the local detention facility shall use
every available means to immediately investigate all reported or
suspected violations of subdivision (a), including, but not limited
to, the use of forensically acceptable means of preserving and
testing the suspected gassing substance to confirm the presence of
human excrement or other bodily fluids or bodily substances. If there
is probable cause to believe that the inmate has violated
subdivision (a), the chief medical officer of the local detention
facility, or his or her designee, may, when he or she deems it
medically necessary to protect the health of an officer or employee
who may have been subject to a violation of this section, order the
inmate to receive an examination or test for hepatitis or
tuberculosis or both hepatitis and tuberculosis on either a voluntary
or involuntary basis immediately after the event, and periodically
thereafter as determined to be necessary by the medical officer in
order to ensure that further hepatitis or tuberculosis transmission
does not occur. These decisions shall be consistent with an
occupational exposure as defined by the Center for Disease Control
and Prevention. The results of any examination or test shall be
provided to the officer or employee who has been subject to a
reported or suspected violation of this section. Nothing in this
subdivision shall be construed to otherwise supersede the operation
of Title 8 (commencing with Section 7500). Any person performing
tests, transmitting test results, or disclosing information pursuant
to this section shall be immune from civil liability for any action
taken in accordance with this section.
(d) The person in charge of the local detention facility shall
refer all reports for which there is probable cause to believe that
the inmate has violated subdivision (a) to the local district
attorney for prosecution.
(e) Nothing in this section shall preclude prosecution under both
this section and any other provision of law.
243.10. (a) Any person who commits a battery against a member of
the United States Armed Forces because of the victim’s service in the
United States Armed Forces shall be punished by a fine not exceeding
two thousand dollars ($2,000), by imprisonment in a county jail for
a period not exceeding one year, or by both that fine and
imprisonment.
(b) “Because of” means that the bias motivation must be a cause in
fact of the battery, whether or not other causes exist. When
multiple concurrent motives exist, the prohibited bias must be a
substantial factor in bringing about the battery.

244. Any person who willfully and maliciously places or throws, or
causes to be placed or thrown, upon the person of another, any
vitriol, corrosive acid, flammable substance, or caustic chemical of
any nature, with the intent to injure the flesh or disfigure the body
of that person, is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison
for two, three or four years.
As used in this section, “flammable substance” means gasoline,
petroleum products, or flammable liquids with a flashpoint of 150
degrees Fahrenheit or less.

244.5. (a) As used in this section, “stun gun” means any item,
except a less lethal weapon, as defined in Section 16780, used or
intended to be used as either an offensive or defensive weapon that
is capable of temporarily immobilizing a person by the infliction of
an electrical charge.
(b) Every person who commits an assault upon the person of another
with a stun gun or less lethal weapon, as defined in Section 16780,
shall be punished by imprisonment in a county jail for a term not
exceeding one year, or by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of
Section 1170 for 16 months, two, or three years.
(c) Every person who commits an assault upon the person of a peace
officer or firefighter with a stun gun or less lethal weapon, as
defined in Section 16780, who knows or reasonably should know that
the person is a peace officer or firefighter engaged in the
performance of his or her duties, when the peace officer or
firefighter is engaged in the performance of his or her duties, shall
be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for a term not
exceeding one year, or by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of
Section 1170 for two, three, or four years.
(d) This section shall not be construed to preclude or in any way
limit the applicability of Section 245 in any criminal prosecution.

245. (a) (1) Any person who commits an assault upon the person of
another with a deadly weapon or instrument other than a firearm or by
any means of force likely to produce great bodily injury shall be
punished by imprisonment in the state prison for two, three, or four
years, or in a county jail for not exceeding one year, or by a fine
not exceeding ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or by both the fine and
imprisonment.
(2) Any person who commits an assault upon the person of another
with a firearm shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison
for two, three, or four years, or in a county jail for not less than
six months and not exceeding one year, or by both a fine not
exceeding ten thousand dollars ($10,000) and imprisonment.
(3) Any person who commits an assault upon the person of another
with a machinegun, as defined in Section 16880, or an assault weapon,
as defined in Section 30510 or 30515, or a .50 BMG rifle, as defined
in Section 30530, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state
prison for 4, 8, or 12 years.
(b) Any person who commits an assault upon the person of another
with a semiautomatic firearm shall be punished by imprisonment in the
state prison for three, six, or nine years.
(c) Any person who commits an assault with a deadly weapon or
instrument, other than a firearm, or by any means likely to produce
great bodily injury upon the person of a peace officer or
firefighter, and who knows or reasonably should know that the victim
is a peace officer or firefighter engaged in the performance of his
or her duties, when the peace officer or firefighter is engaged in
the performance of his or her duties, shall be punished by
imprisonment in the state prison for three, four, or five years.
(d) (1) Any person who commits an assault with a firearm upon the
person of a peace officer or firefighter, and who knows or reasonably
should know that the victim is a peace officer or firefighter
engaged in the performance of his or her duties, when the peace
officer or firefighter is engaged in the performance of his or her
duties, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for
four, six, or eight years.
(2) Any person who commits an assault upon the person of a peace
officer or firefighter with a semiautomatic firearm and who knows or
reasonably should know that the victim is a peace officer or
firefighter engaged in the performance of his or her duties, when the
peace officer or firefighter is engaged in the performance of his or
her duties, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison
for five, seven, or nine years.
(3) Any person who commits an assault with a machinegun, as
defined in Section 16880, or an assault weapon, as defined in Section
30510 or 30515, or a .50 BMG rifle, as defined in Section 30530,
upon the person of a peace officer or firefighter, and who knows or
reasonably should know that the victim is a peace officer or
firefighter engaged in the performance of his or her duties, shall be
punished by imprisonment in the state prison for 6, 9, or 12 years.
(e) When a person is convicted of a violation of this section in a
case involving use of a deadly weapon or instrument or firearm, and
the weapon or instrument or firearm is owned by that person, the
court shall order that the weapon or instrument or firearm be deemed
a nuisance, and it shall be confiscated and disposed of in the manner
provided by Sections 18000 and 18005.
(f) As used in this section, “peace officer” refers to any person
designated as a peace officer in Chapter 4.5 (commencing with Section
830) of Title 3 of Part 2.

245. (a) (1) Any person who commits an assault upon the person of
another with a deadly weapon or instrument other than a firearm shall
be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for two, three, or
four years, or in a county jail for not exceeding one year, or by a
fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or by both the
fine and imprisonment.
(2) Any person who commits an assault upon the person of another
with a firearm shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison
for two, three, or four years, or in a county jail for not less than
six months and not exceeding one year, or by both a fine not
exceeding ten thousand dollars ($10,000) and imprisonment.
(3) Any person who commits an assault upon the person of another
with a machinegun, as defined in Section 16880, or an assault weapon,
as defined in Section 30510 or 30515, or a .50 BMG rifle, as defined
in Section 30530, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state
prison for 4, 8, or 12 years.
(4) Any person who commits an assault upon the person of another
by any means of force likely to produce great bodily injury shall be
punished by imprisonment in the state prison for two, three, or four
years, or in a county jail for not exceeding one year, or by a fine
not exceeding ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or by both the fine and
imprisonment.
(b) Any person who commits an assault upon the person of another
with a semiautomatic firearm shall be punished by imprisonment in the
state prison for three, six, or nine years.
(c) Any person who commits an assault with a deadly weapon or
instrument, other than a firearm, or by any means likely to produce
great bodily injury upon the person of a peace officer or
firefighter, and who knows or reasonably should know that the victim
is a peace officer or firefighter engaged in the performance of his
or her duties, when the peace officer or firefighter is engaged in
the performance of his or her duties, shall be punished by
imprisonment in the state prison for three, four, or five years.
(d) (1) Any person who commits an assault with a firearm upon the
person of a peace officer or firefighter, and who knows or reasonably
should know that the victim is a peace officer or firefighter
engaged in the performance of his or her duties, when the peace
officer or firefighter is engaged in the performance of his or her
duties, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for
four, six, or eight years.
(2) Any person who commits an assault upon the person of a peace
officer or firefighter with a semiautomatic firearm and who knows or
reasonably should know that the victim is a peace officer or
firefighter engaged in the performance of his or her duties, when the
peace officer or firefighter is engaged in the performance of his or
her duties, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison
for five, seven, or nine years.
(3) Any person who commits an assault with a machinegun, as
defined in Section 16880, or an assault weapon, as defined in Section
30510 or 30515, or a .50 BMG rifle, as defined in Section 30530,
upon the person of a peace officer or firefighter, and who knows or
reasonably should know that the victim is a peace officer or
firefighter engaged in the performance of his or her duties, shall be
punished by imprisonment in the state prison for 6, 9, or 12 years.
(e) When a person is convicted of a violation of this section in a
case involving use of a deadly weapon or instrument or firearm, and
the weapon or instrument or firearm is owned by that person, the
court shall order that the weapon or instrument or firearm be deemed
a nuisance, and it shall be confiscated and disposed of in the manner
provided by Sections 18000 and 18005.
(f) As used in this section, “peace officer” refers to any person
designated as a peace officer in Chapter 4.5 (commencing with Section
830) of Title 3 of Part 2.
245.1. As used in Sections 148.2, 241, 243, 244.5, and 245,
“fireman” or “firefighter” includes any person who is an officer,
employee or member of a fire department or fire protection or
firefighting agency of the federal government, the State of
California, a city, county, city and county, district, or other
public or municipal corporation or political subdivision of this
state, whether this person is a volunteer or partly paid or fully
paid.
As used in Section 148.2, “emergency rescue personnel” means any
person who is an officer, employee or member of a fire department or
fire protection or firefighting agency of the federal government, the
State of California, a city, county, city and county, district, or
other public or municipal corporation or political subdivision of
this state, whether this person is a volunteer or partly paid or
fully paid, while he or she is actually engaged in the on-the-site
rescue of persons or property during an emergency as defined by
subdivision (c) of Section 148.3.

245.2. Every person who commits an assault with a deadly weapon or
instrument or by any means of force likely to produce great bodily
injury upon the person of an operator, driver, or passenger on a bus,
taxicab, streetcar, cable car, trackless trolley, or other motor
vehicle, including a vehicle operated on stationary rails or on a
track or rail suspended in the air, used for the transportation of
persons for hire, or upon the person of a station agent or ticket
agent for the entity providing such transportation, when the driver,
operator, or agent is engaged in the performance of his or her
duties, and where the person who commits the assault knows or
reasonably should know that the victim is engaged in the performance
of his or her duties, or is a passenger, shall be punished by
imprisonment in the state prison for three, four, or five years.

245.3. Every person who commits an assault with a deadly weapon or
instrument or by any means likely to produce great bodily injury upon
the person of a custodial officer as defined in Section 831 or
831.5, and who knows or reasonably should know that the victim is a
custodial officer engaged in the performance of that person’s duties,
shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for three,
four, or five years.
When a person is convicted of a violation of this section in a
case involving use of a deadly weapon or instrument, and such weapon
or instrument is owned by that person, the court may, in its
discretion, order that the weapon or instrument be deemed a nuisance
and shall be confiscated and destroyed in the manner provided by
Sections 18000 and 18005.
245.5. (a) Every person who commits an assault with a deadly weapon
or instrument, other than a firearm, or by any means likely to
produce great bodily injury upon the person of a school employee, and
who knows or reasonably should know that the victim is a school
employee engaged in the performance of his or her duties, when that
school employee is engaged in the performance of his or her duties,
shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for three,
four, or five years, or in a county jail not exceeding one year.
(b) Every person who commits an assault with a firearm upon the
person of a school employee, and who knows or reasonably should know
that the victim is a school employee engaged in the performance of
his or her duties, when the school employee is engaged in the
performance of his or her duties, shall be punished by imprisonment
in the state prison for four, six, or eight years, or in a county
jail for not less than six months and not exceeding one year.
(c) Every person who commits an assault upon the person of a
school employee with a stun gun or taser, and who knows or reasonably
should know that the person is a school employee engaged in the
performance of his or her duties, when the school employee is engaged
in the performance of his or her duties, shall be punished by
imprisonment in a county jail for a term not exceeding one year or by
imprisonment in the state prison for two, three, or four years.
This subdivision shall not be construed to preclude or in any way
limit the applicability of Section 245 in any criminal prosecution.
(d) As used in the section, “school employee” means any person
employed as a permanent or probationary certificated or classified
employee of a school district on a part-time or full-time basis,
including a substitute teacher. “School employee,” as used in this
section, also includes a student teacher, or a school board member.
“School,” as used in this section, has the same meaning as that term
is defined in Section 626.

245.6. (a) It shall be unlawful to engage in hazing, as defined in
this section.
(b) “Hazing” means any method of initiation or preinitiation into
a student organization or student body, whether or not the
organization or body is officially recognized by an educational
institution, which is likely to cause serious bodily injury to any
former, current, or prospective student of any school, community
college, college, university, or other educational institution in
this state. The term “hazing” does not include customary athletic
events or school-sanctioned events.
(c) A violation of this section that does not result in serious
bodily injury is a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not less than
one hundred dollars ($100), nor more than five thousand dollars
($5,000), or imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one
year, or both.
(d) Any person who personally engages in hazing that results in
death or serious bodily injury as defined in paragraph (4) of
subdivision (f) of Section 243 of the Penal Code, is guilty of either
a misdemeanor or a felony, and shall be punished by imprisonment in
county jail not exceeding one year, or by imprisonment pursuant to
subdivision (h) of Section 1170.
(e) The person against whom the hazing is directed may commence a
civil action for injury or damages. The action may be brought against
any participants in the hazing, or any organization to which the
student is seeking membership whose agents, directors, trustees,
managers, or officers authorized, requested, commanded, participated
in, or ratified the hazing.
(f) Prosecution under this section shall not prohibit prosecution
under any other provision of law.

246. Any person who shall maliciously and willfully discharge a
firearm at an inhabited dwelling house, occupied building, occupied
motor vehicle, occupied aircraft, inhabited housecar, as defined in
Section 362 of the Vehicle Code, or inhabited camper, as defined in
Section 243 of the Vehicle Code, is guilty of a felony, and upon
conviction shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for
three, five, or seven years, or by imprisonment in the county jail
for a term of not less than six months and not exceeding one year.
As used in this section, “inhabited” means currently being used
for dwelling purposes, whether occupied or not.

246.1. (a) Except as provided in subdivision (f), upon the
conviction of any person found guilty of murder in the first or
second degree, manslaughter, attempted murder, assault with a deadly
weapon, the unlawful discharge or brandishing of a firearm from or at
an occupied vehicle where the victim was killed, attacked, or
assaulted from or in a motor vehicle by the use of a firearm on a
public street or highway, or the unlawful possession of a firearm by
a member of a criminal street gang, as defined in subdivision (f) of
Section 186.22, while present in a vehicle the court shall order a
vehicle used in the commission of that offense sold.
Any vehicle ordered to be sold pursuant to this subdivision shall
be surrendered to the sheriff of the county or the chief of police of
the city in which the violation occurred. The officer to whom the
vehicle is surrendered shall promptly ascertain from the Department
of Motor Vehicles the names and addresses of all legal and registered
owners of the vehicle and within five days of receiving that
information, shall send by certified mail a notice to all legal and
registered owners of the vehicle other than the defendant, at the
addresses obtained from the department, informing them that the
vehicle has been declared a nuisance and will be sold or otherwise
disposed of pursuant to this section, and of the approximate date and
location of the sale or other disposition. The notice shall also
inform any legal owner of its right to conduct the sale pursuant to
subdivision (b).
(b) Any legal owner which in the regular course of its business
conducts sales of repossessed or surrendered motor vehicles may take
possession and conduct the sale of the vehicle if it notifies the
officer to whom the vehicle is surrendered of its intent to conduct
the sale within 15 days of the mailing of the notice pursuant to
subdivision (a). Sale of the vehicle pursuant to this subdivision may
be conducted at the time, in the manner, and on the notice usually
given by the legal owner for the sale of repossessed or surrendered
vehicles. The proceeds of any sale conducted by the legal owner shall
be disposed of as provided in subdivision (d).
(c) If the legal owner does not notify the officer to whom the
vehicle is surrendered of its intent to conduct the sale as provided
in subdivision (b), the officer shall offer the vehicle for sale at
public auction within 60 days of receiving the vehicle. At least 10
days but not more than 20 days prior to the sale, not counting the
day of sale, the officer shall give notice of the sale by advertising
once in a newspaper of general circulation published in the city or
county, as the case may be, in which the vehicle is located, which
notice shall contain a description of the make, year, model,
identification number, and license number of the vehicle, and the
date, time, and location of the sale. For motorcycles, the engine
number shall also be included. If there is no newspaper of general
circulation published in the county, notice shall be given by posting
a notice of sale containing the information required by this
subdivision in three of the most public places in the city or county
in which the vehicle is located and at the place where the vehicle is
to be sold for 10 consecutive days prior to and including the day of
the sale.
(d) The proceeds of a sale conducted pursuant to this section
shall be disposed of in the following priority:
(1) To satisfy the costs of the sale, including costs incurred
with respect to the taking and keeping of the vehicle pending sale.
(2) To the legal owner in an amount to satisfy the indebtedness
owed to the legal owner remaining as of the date of sale, including
accrued interest or finance charges and delinquency charges.
(3) To the holder of any subordinate lien or encumbrance on the
vehicle to satisfy any indebtedness so secured if written
notification of demand is received before distribution of the
proceeds is completed. The holder of a subordinate lien or
encumbrance, if requested, shall reasonably furnish reasonable proof
of its interest, and unless it does so on request is not entitled to
distribution pursuant to this paragraph.
(4) To any other person who can establish an interest in the
vehicle, including a community property interest, to the extent of
his or her provable interest.
(5) The balance, if any, to the city or county in which the
violation occurred, to be deposited in a special account in its
general fund to be used exclusively to pay the costs or a part of the
costs of providing services or education to prevent juvenile
violence.
The person conducting the sale shall disburse the proceeds of the
sale as provided in this subdivision, and provide a written
accounting regarding the disposition to all persons entitled to or
claiming a share of the proceeds, within 15 days after the sale is
conducted.
(e) If the vehicle to be sold under this section is not of the
type that can readily be sold to the public generally, the vehicle
shall be destroyed or donated to an eleemosynary institution.
(f) No vehicle may be sold pursuant to this section in either of
the following circumstances:
(1) The vehicle is stolen, unless the identity of the legal and
registered owners of the vehicle cannot be reasonably ascertained.
(2) The vehicle is owned by another, or there is a community
property interest in the vehicle owned by a person other than the
defendant and the vehicle is the only vehicle available to the
defendant’s immediate family which may be operated on the highway
with a class 3 or class 4 driver’s license.
(g) A vehicle is used in the commission of a violation of the
offenses enumerated in subdivision (a) if a firearm is discharged
either from the vehicle at another person or by an occupant of a
vehicle other than the vehicle in which the victim is an occupant.

 

246.3. (a) Except as otherwise authorized by law, any person who
willfully discharges a firearm in a grossly negligent manner which
could result in injury or death to a person is guilty of a public
offense and shall be punished by imprisonment in a county jail not
exceeding one year, or by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of
Section 1170.
(b) Except as otherwise authorized by law, any person who
willfully discharges a BB device in a grossly negligent manner which
could result in injury or death to a person is guilty of a public
offense and shall be punished by imprisonment in a county jail not
exceeding one year.
(c) As used in this section, “BB device” means any instrument that
expels a projectile, such as a BB or a pellet, through the force of
air pressure, gas pressure, or spring action.

247. (a) Any person who willfully and maliciously discharges a
firearm at an unoccupied aircraft is guilty of a felony.
(b) Any person who discharges a firearm at an unoccupied motor
vehicle or an uninhabited building or dwelling house is guilty of a
public offense punishable by imprisonment in the county jail for not
more than one year or in the state prison. This subdivision does not
apply to shooting at an abandoned vehicle, unoccupied vehicle,
uninhabited building, or dwelling house with the permission of the
owner.
As used in this section and Section 246 “aircraft” means any
contrivance intended for and capable of transporting persons through
the airspace.

247.5. Any person who willfully and maliciously discharges a laser
at an aircraft, whether in motion or in flight, while occupied, is
guilty of a violation of this section, which shall be punishable as
either a misdemeanor by imprisonment in the county jail for not more
than one year or by a fine of one thousand dollars ($1,000), or a
felony by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170
for 16 months, two years, or three years, or by a fine of two
thousand dollars ($2,000). This section does not apply to the conduct
of laser development activity by or on behalf of the United States
Armed Forces.
As used in this section, “aircraft” means any contrivance intended
for and capable of transporting persons through the airspace.
As used in this section, “laser” means a device that utilizes the
natural oscillations of atoms or molecules between energy levels for
generating coherent electromagnetic radiation in the ultraviolet,
visible, or infrared region of the spectrum, and when discharged
exceeds one milliwatt continuous wave.

248. Any person who, with the intent to interfere with the
operation of an aircraft, willfully shines a light or other bright
device, of an intensity capable of impairing the operation of an
aircraft, at an aircraft, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding
one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by imprisonment in a county jail
not exceeding one year, or by both that fine and imprisonment.